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I. INTRODUCTION
How might we think about reforming abortion regulation in a world
in which the basic legality of abortion may, as a matter of constitutional
law, at last be relatively secure? I have in mind the era just upon us in
which the overturn of Roe v. Wade1 no longer looms so threateningly over
the reproductive rights community in the United States and is no longer
necessarily its central concern. There is now a general and seemingly wellfounded optimism that under the Obama administration, those who support
and rely on reproductive rights will not have to pray nightly for the health
of Supreme Court justices (although we wish them well). As Senator
Obama said in 2008 on the 35th anniversary of Roe:
With one more vacancy on the Supreme Court, we could be
looking at a majority hostile to a woman’s fundamental right to
choose for the first time since Roe v. Wade. The next president
may be asked to nominate that Supreme Court justice. That is
what is at stake in this election.2

It appears that since January 20, 2009, Justice Stevens may, if he
wishes, hang out rather than hang on, and the rest of us may now be more
confident that vacancies on the court are less likely to put the basic right to
abortion in jeopardy. President Obama’s first Supreme Court appointment,
Sonia Sotomayor, characterized the Court’s decision in Planned
1

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

2

Press Release, Barack Obama, Statement on 35th Anniversary of Roe v. Wade
Decision (Jan. 22, 2008), http://www.barackobama.com/2008/01/22/obama_statement
_on_35th_ annive.php.
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Parenthood vs. Casey as “settled” and “the precedent of the court” during
her confirmation hearings.3 While confidence in a justice’s future decisions
is never assured, it seems, for the moment anyway, that Roe will not be
overturned. 4
Despite the relief that flows from this greater sense of reproductive
security, much legal work still needs to be done to secure healthier
reproductive lives for women. Some of that work will remain
constitutionally focused. Without the prospect of overturning Roe in the
immediate future, pro-life legislators may focus ever more vigorously on
whittling down women’s access to abortion through the targeted hyperregulation of abortion provision, access, and consent.5 Ever since the stingy
affirmance of Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,6 the Supreme Court has
affirmed the constitutionality of almost every regulatory requirement
imposed by states on abortion patients, clinics, and doctors.7 Constant
vigilance over Roe may no longer be required, but lawyers still have plenty
to do defending its current boundaries.
Yet constitutional advocacy is only part of the project for a prochoice post-Roe agenda.8 This Article considers the possibilities for
statutory abortion reform and seeks to extend the audience to include
3

Charlie Savage, Respecting Precedent, or Settled Law, Unless It’s Not Settled,
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/15/us/politics/
15abortion.html.
4

See, e.g., Charlie Savage, On Sotomayor, Some Abortion Rights Backers Are
Uneasy, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/28/us/
politics/28abortion.html.
5

See generally Center for Reproductive Rights, Targeted Regulation of Abortion
Providers
(TRAP):
Avoiding
the
TRAP
(Nov.
1,
2007),
http://reproductiverights.org/en/document/targeted-regulation-of-abortion-providers-trapavoiding-the-trap.
6

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).

7
As a Fourth Circuit judge observed in a South Carolina case, these burdensome
regulations—“micromanaging everything from elevator safety to countertop varnish to the
location of janitors’ closets”—have in a number of states “made abortions effectively
unavailable, if not technically illegal.” Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Comm’r, S.C. Dep’t of
Health & Envtl. Control, 317 F.3d 357, 371–72 (4th Cir. 2002) (King, J., dissenting)
(upholding an elaborate set of state abortion regulations).
8

See Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing
Abortion Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1409–12 (2009) (arguing that the “court-generated
rights discourse” has legitimated a minimalist state response to the problems of pregnant
women).
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legislatures in addition to courts. Are there arguments that have been
obscured or overlooked in recent years but that, when brought more clearly
to light, might appeal to those who enact statutes or to the citizens who vote
for them? The possibilities for reform seem especially exciting right now.
Not only has Roe’s reversal become less likely, but a number of Bush-era
anti-abortion policies have already been countermanded by President
Obama. These include the ban on aid to family planning programs abroad, 9
prohibitions on stem cell research,10 and a last-minute conscientious
objection opt-out for health care providers.11 Once the subject of abortion is
freed from the pervasive demonization expressed in the policies and politics
of the last several years, we might be able to consider its regulation more
reflectively.
Indeed, there have been recent signs that electorates, when more
directly involved in reproductive issues, do not in every instance vote to
make abortion less accessible. In November 2008, the voters of South
Dakota rejected Measure 11, a comprehensive abortion ban;12 Colorado
voters rejected the Definition of Person Initiative, which would have
defined a “person[]” as “any human being from the moment of
fertilization”;13 and, importantly for the present discussion, Californians
9
See Rob Stein & Michael Shear, Funding Restored to Groups that Perform
Abortions, Other Care, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2009, at A3.
10

See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Lifts Bush’s Strict Limits on Stem Cell
TIMES,
Mar.
10,
2009,
available
at
Research,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/10/us/politics/10stem.html.
11

See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Obama to Rescind Bush Abortion Rule, WASH.
POST, Feb. 28, 2009, at A1. There is also sensible movement in the area of sex education.
See Sharon Jayson, Obama Budget Shifts Money from Abstinence-only Sex Education; It’s a
major reversal from Bush’s policies, USA TODAY, May 12, 2009, at D4. Unreasonable
restrictions in other areas, such as the ban on abortions for soldiers and dependents in
military hospitals overseas, await reform. 10 U.S.C. § 1093(b) (2009) (forbidding elective
abortions at medical treatment facilities run by the Department of Defense and ending
Clinton’s short-lived executive order, 58 Fed. Reg. 6439 (Jan. 22, 1993)).
12

The vote was 55% to 45% against the measure. See S.D. Sec’y of State, Election
Night Results (Nov. 12, 2008), http://electionresults.sd.gov/applications/st25cers3/
resultsSW.aspx?type=bq.
13

The vote was 73% to 27% against the initiative. Election Results 2008:
Colorado, N.Y. TIMES, available at http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/states/
colorado.html. The Initiative proposed to amend the constitution is as follows: “As used in
sections 3, 6, and 25 of Article II of the state constitution, the terms ‘person’ or ‘persons’
shall include any human being from the moment of fertilization.” Colorado Secretary of
State,
Amendment
48:
Formerly
Proposed
Initiative
#36,
http://www.elections.colorado.gov/Default.aspx?PageMenuID=1230 (last visited Oct. 1,
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voted against Proposition 4, the Waiting Period and Parental Notice Before
Termination of Minor’s Pregnancy Initiative.14 These developments suggest
that now may be the time to take a breath, “dust ourselves off,” in President
Obama’s inaugural phrase,15 and consider anew the values and topics that
constitute “talking about abortion.”
What then might a public conversation about abortion look like—
what topics might we collectively rethink—once the overturn of Roe is
taken off the table? This article suggests a revision in the terms of the
debate. As we know, supporters of legal abortion have long been on the
linguistic defensive, as the vocabulary of “life” and “unborn children” has
framed how people have come to think about abortion: what it is, whose
interests are at stake, and whose are incidental.16 There are, however, other
concepts that might forcefully frame the discussion, I have in mind dignity
and respect—concepts that in other legal contexts are taken quite seriously
but that seem to have fallen to the side with regard to women in the context
of abortion.
In putting the dignity of women on the table, I recognize that there
is also ongoing discussion about the dignity of fetus, and that for some this
is a source of opposition to abortion.17 But the attribution of dignity to
fetuses and embryos should not undermine the importance of securing
dignity for women as they exercise their rights under existing law. Abortion
is a legal medical procedure in the United States and legislation
2009). See also Nicholas Riccardi, Initiatives to Curb Abortions Defeated, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
5, 2008, at A18.
14
The vote was 52% to 48% against the proposal. League of Women Voters of
California Education Fund, Proposition 4, http://www.smartvoter.org/2008/11/04/ca/state/
prop/4/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2009).
15
Barack H. Obama, Presidential Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/.
16

For a discussion of the rhetorical advantages of “pro-life” over “pro-choice,” see
Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of Life, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 753, 806–07 (2006) [hereinafter Sanger, Legislating in the Culture of Life]. See
generally CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT, DECODING ABORTION RHETORIC: THE
COMMUNICATION OF SOCIAL CHANGE (1994).
17

See, e.g., ROBERT GEORGE & CHRISTOPHER TOLLEFSON, EMBRYO: IN DEFENSE OF
HUMAN LIFE 105–09 (2008) (explaining that the destruction of embryos in the course of
embryonic research is “an assault on human life” and “an assault on human dignity no matter
the victim’s age or size or stage of development”). Fetal dignity has also served as a basis for
upholding abortion regulation. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) (noting
that the Partial Birth Abortion Act “expresses respect for the dignity of human life”).
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criminalizing it is constitutionally prohibited. Yet abortion regulation too
often proceeds as though this were not quite the case. It is as though
abortion’s legality is somehow up for grabs and burdening women’s dignity
in each individual case remains fair game. I am particularly concerned with
the use of legal processes in this enterprise, and therefore focus on the law’s
subversion of dignity in connection with a woman’s decision to have an
abortion. I take as my example a particular category of women—pregnant
minors—and look at their treatment under a regulatory scheme known as
the judicial bypass process. This is the requirement that teenagers who want
to have an abortion without notifying or getting consent from their parents
must first go to court and convince a judge that they are sufficiently mature
and informed to make the decision themselves.
Much current legislation seems premised on the assumption that
women—both young women and older ones—make decisions about
abortion lightly, or impulsively, and that if only they were made to reflect
just a bit longer and with a bit more information, they would change their
minds. The “bit more” which legislators have sought to convey is a bundled
set of propositions: that human life begins at conception, that an embryo or
fetus at any stage of development is “a whole separate, unique, living
human being”;18 that women who abort will suffer emotional damage for
the rest of their lives;19 and that women must grasp all of this before they
can consent to an abortion. This information is relayed through a variety of
verbal and visual means including scripted physician disclosure statements,
illustrated brochures of fetal development, and, most recently, the
requirement that women undergo an ultrasound and “complete a required
form to acknowledge that she either saw the ultrasound image of her unborn

18
For example, doctors in South Dakota must inform their abortion patients that
abortion ends “the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being.” S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1) (b) (2008). See Planned Parenthood of Minn., N.D., S.D., v.
Rounds, No. Civ. 05-4077-KES, 2009 WL 2600753, at *2–3 (D.S.D. Aug. 20, 2009)
(upholding the “Biological Disclosure” requirement). For two excellent critiques, see
generally Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening,
89 B.U. L. REV. 939 (2009) (focusing on the patient’s obligation to listen) and Robert Post,
Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech,
2007 U. ILL L. REV 939 (focusing on the physician’s obligation to speak).
19

S.D. TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION, REPORT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA TASK
FORCE
TO
STUDY
ABORTION
41–48
(2005),
available
at
http://www.voteyesforlife.com/docs/Task_Force_Report.pdf [hereinafter S.D. TASK FORCE
REPORT].
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child or that she was offered the opportunity and rejected it” before
consenting to an abortion.20
The discussion here is guided by a very different premise: that
women, even young women, understand very well what an abortion is.
Women understand that abortion ends pregnancy and that if they have an
abortion, they will not have a baby; that is its very point. The significance
of this decision may differ from woman to woman and girl to girl. In
deciding whether or not to continue a pregnancy, each will draw upon her
own sensibilities, circumstances, and beliefs. But I accept that, as with other
deeply intimate decisions and commitments—who to marry, whether to
pray, how to vote—women themselves are able and best positioned to
decide what is at stake. Of course, leaving the choice to women does not
mean that abortion decisions are “law-free.” Like other medical decisions
and like the exercise of other constitutional rights (for abortion distinctively
partakes of both), abortion decisions are certainly regulated and regulable
by law. But there are also limiting principles as to how the law should
intervene, and these include respecting the dignity of she who decides.
What exactly do I mean by dignity? The term has a variety of
definitions and uses in constitutional law,21 moral philosophy,22 and in the
theory and practice of human rights.23 These share in common the general
view that people “possess an intrinsic worth that should be recognized and
respected,” and that they should not be subjected to treatment by the state
that is inconsistent with their intrinsic worth.24 Treatment that disrespects
human dignity takes many forms, but it is the idea of dignity in connection
with a decision to exercise a right in court that is my focus here.
Specifically, what is the relation between the detailed regulation of abortion
decisions and the right of women to be treated with dignity regarding such a
decision? The question goes to the heart of what I call decisional dignity:
the respect owed by law not only to the process of making an abortion
20

Woman’s Right to Know Act, ALA. CODE § 26.23A.4 (2009).

21
See Gerald Neuman, Human Dignity in the United States Constitution, in ZUR
AUTONOMIE DES INDIVIDUUMS 250 (Dieter Simon & Manfred Weiss eds., 2000) (presenting
an historical and topical account of dignity in American constitutional law).
22
See generally Michael J. Meyer, Dignity, Rights, and Self-Control, 99 ETHICS
520 (1989); Aurel Kolnai, Dignity, 51 PHIL. 251 (1976).
23

For a good recent discussion of this topic, albeit somewhat skeptical in tone, see
generally Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human
Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655 (2008).
24

See Neuman, supra note 21, at 249–50.
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decision but also to the decision itself once it has been made.25 A woman
who has decided to abort should not as a matter of law be subject to
disrespectful, harassing, or punitive treatment by virtue of her decision.
Reva Siegel has shown that dignity offers a forceful basis for
constitutional analysis.26 But dignitarian concerns also appeal at a more
instinctive level. There are times when we cannot help but notice that
something in or about law seems to have gone wrong and that someone is
being harmed—whether humiliated, disrespected, or punished—in ways
that seem to put their dignity at stake. Frank Michelman noticed something
like this in the early 1970s with regard to restrictions on poor people’s
access to court in civil matters: “Perhaps there is something generally
demeaning, humiliating, and infuriating about finding oneself in a dispute
over legal rights and wrongs and being unable to uphold one’s own side of
the case.”27 At such moments, it is important to take a closer look at what is
going on and to consider whether such harms are warranted or unfair,
intended or incidental, and what exactly what law has to do with their
imposition.
The aim of approaching the question in this way is to develop a
broader conceptualization of the harms imposed by law on women who
seek to end an unwanted pregnancy. Certainly much attention has been paid
to the kinds of harm women suffer when they are unable to get abortions, or
harms that were suffered in the pre-Roe days, when they were unable to get
legal abortions.28 Much attention has also been paid by the pro-life
movement to what women suffer, or are said to suffer, by virtue of having
25

For a discussion of how certain abortion regulation improperly interferes with
the decision-making process, see generally Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory
Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351 (2008) [hereinafter
Sanger, Seeing and Believing] (arguing that not only the right to decide about abortion, but
the deliberative path taken to reaching a decision is protected).
26

See generally Reva Siegel, The Politics of Protection: A Movement History and
Dignity Analysis of Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008).
(showing how the Supreme Court’s commitment to women’s dignity implicates both
substantive due process and equal protection). But see West, supra note 8 (discussing
negative consequences of the court’s response).
27

Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right
to Protect One’s Own Rights, Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1174. In this article, Michelman
explores four jurisprudential values that might have underpinned the Supreme Court’s
decisions in three Fee Access cases of the early 1970s. These are dignity values,
participation values, deterrence values, and effectuation values. Id.
28
See generally RICKIE SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUSIE (1992); LESLIE REAGAN,
WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME (1998).
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abortions, whether it is the now-discredited claims about breast cancer29 or
the promised range of emotional harms, such as guilt, depression, and
suicide.30
There has, however, been little public discussion of the harms
women suffer by virtue of abortion regulation, even when they are, in the
end, able to obtain a legal abortion. A judicial determination that one or
another regulation is constitutional (because, in the now familiar language
of Casey, the regulation does not have “the purpose or effect of presenting a
substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion”31) may not answer the
question of whether a particular regulation has a harmful purpose or effect,
whether or not it satisfies Casey. Even constitutional regulations may inflict
objectionable harms on those who have no choice but to comply with them.
This Article considers the assault on the decisional dignity of young
women through their participation in the judicial bypass process. Bypass
hearings provide an instance where a woman’s decision and her dignity
stand in special relation to one another. Other forms of abortion regulation,
such as compulsory brochures, waiting periods, or mandatory ultrasounds,
are often justified in terms of informed consent.32 The idea is that, without
particular information and sufficient time, a woman does not know enough
to decide about abortion.33 But bypass hearings work differently. While
girls are typically questioned about their knowledge of abortion (details of
29
See House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Investigating the State of
Science Under the Bush Administration: Breast Cancer Risks, http://oversight.house.gov/
features/politics_and_science/example_breast_cancer.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2009). In
2003, the NCI website was changed to report a major study that concluded that “having an
abortion or miscarriage does not increase a woman’s subsequent risk of developing breast
cancer.” National Cancer Institute, Abortion, Miscarriage, and Breast Cancer Risk,
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/abortion-miscarriage (last visited Oct. 1,
2009).
30
See Elizabeth Shadigian, Reviewing the Evidence, Breaking the Silence: Longterm Physical and Psychological Health Consequences of Induced Abortion, in THE COST OF
“CHOICE”: WOMEN EVALUATE THE IMPACT OF ABORTION 63, 68–69 (Erika Bachiochi ed.,
2004) (concluding on the basis of two studies, one Finnish, one U.S., that women have
higher long-term rates of suicide and self-harm following abortion). See also S.D. TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 19, at 33, 43, 50.
31

Planned Parenthood Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877–78 (1992).

32

In this regard, there has been a serious blurring by state legislators between
medically informed consent and what might better be understood as “morally informed
consent.” See Sanger, Seeing and Believing, supra note 25, at 397–403.
33

See S.D. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 19, at 34–41.
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the procedure, alternatives, possible consequences), the task before the
judge is not to provide the petitioner with additional information. Rather,
the judge is to assess whether the petitioner is mature and informed enough
to credit the decision she has already made. The teenager’s decision has
occasioned the hearing in the first place; it takes place only after she has
formally indicated her intention to end her pregnancy by petitioning the
court. This structural relationship between decision and regulation gives us
a chance to consider how the law affects not only the process of abortion
decision-making but also the consequence of having made the decision.
What does the law mean to accomplish through the formal
interrogation of pregnant minors in court? This Article argues that bypass
hearings serve less to evaluate the quality of a young woman’s decision
than to punish her for making it. The hearings provide an opportunity to
inflict a kind of legal harm—harm by process—on young women seeking to
abort. They produce a civil version of what Malcolm Feeley identified in
the criminal context as “process as punishment.”34 This is the proposition
that participation in criminal proceedings, long before trial or conviction,
can itself be punitive.35 My primary focus is on a form of harm that is
pervasive but not always immediately apparent. This is the humiliation of
minors through the mechanism of what I call “compelled narrative”—the
requirement that minors testify in court about their sexual relationships,
their pregnancy, and the intricacies of home life that led them to decide not
to involve parents but to turn to law for relief instead.
Bypass hearings should concern us specifically, as lawyers and as
citizens, because of how legal process is used to patrol teenage abortion and
to harass girls who petition for relief. How does this come about? Hearings
are supposed to be a source of dignity, not disrespect, a site of justice, not
harm. Yet there is something intuitively unseemly, perhaps even suspicious,
about the practice of sending girls to court in these circumstances. As
Feeley observed with regard to the treatment of low-level criminal
defendants in pretrial hearings, “[w]hatever majesty there is in the law may
depend heavily on these encounters”; they are where many people “form
impressions of the American system of criminal justice.”36 Of course,
bypass hearings are not criminal; the petitioning minor appears unopposed
in a civil action. Yet the hearings often seem as if they were criminal,
particularly to minors—once the “favorites of the law” on account of their
34

See generally MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 5 (1992).

35

Id. at 199–201.

36

Id. at 5.
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vulnerability—who have no choice but to encounter law as it is handed to
them in trial courts around the country.
With this framework in mind—and keeping an eye on the majesty
of law—Part II begins with an overview of the bypass system: its
constitutional origins and key procedural features. These include the
mechanics of filing, the centrality of confidentiality and speed, the
standards used to determine a minor’s maturity and best interests, and the
ever-important burden of proof. It is important to have a sense of these
basic rules in order to understand how they are implemented by real judges
and how they are experienced by real girls.
The Article then turns to the matter of harm. One way to assess
harm might be to look at the outcome of bypass hearings; are most pregnant
minors turned down and left to fend for themselves? The answer is no.
Despite the perplexing quality of a great many decisions in which petitions
are turned down, almost all petitions that are filed are approved. But that
seemingly positive news about outcomes distracts attention from the
injurious content of the hearings themselves. For it is less a hearing’s
outcome—whether a girl’s petition is granted or denied—than the
consequences for her by virtue of her participation in the process that is the
problem.
Part III explores two specific categories of harm. The first concerns
the immediate risks of medical delay and public exposure. The second takes
up the more subtle matter of humiliation and considers just what constitutes
humiliation for a pregnant teenage girl. Humiliation is often contextually
contingent in ways that are not universally apparent. As Justice Ruth
Ginsburg recently observed with regard to the strip search of a middle
schooler, “[i]t’s a very sensitive age for a girl. I didn’t think my [male]
colleagues, some of them, quite understood.”37 Attending to the spirit of
Justice Ginsburg’s observation, this Part looks at the kinds of testimony
pregnant girls are asked to produce and at the problematic relation between
testimony, humiliation, and dignity in this fraught context. It also considers
the stab to dignity when courts refuse, as some do, to hear a girl’s case at
all.
Part IV zooms in on a particularly troubling aspect of bypass
testimony. Depending on the judge—and as we shall see, a great deal
depends on the judge—bypass petitioners are sometimes urged to do more
than prove their maturity. In some courts they are also expected to display
37

Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg: Court Needs Another Woman, USA TODAY, May 5,
2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2009-05-05-ruth
ginsburg_N.htm.
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some form of remorse or moral accountability. Because remorse suggests
culpability, it is important to understand the nature of the minor’s
wrongdoing, as well as how she is supposed to overcome it in this context.
To do this, I consider bypass hearings alongside other hearings involving
supplicants before the law. These include parole hearings, allocutions
before sentencing, and the interesting historical example of pardon tales
from sixteenth century France. Each illuminates the situation of those
compelled to tell a story in court in order to obtain the benefit of law. That
task is especially hard in the bypass setting where, as we shall see, the very
structure of the hearing conveys an element of stealth, and where the
petitioners’ age and sex limit their performative scope.
Part V returns to the question of purpose, and I focus on two
aspects of this: the significant expressive function, social and political, of
parental involvement legislation and the bypass process as punishment. The
two fit together, as girls are made to pay a price both for deciding on
abortion and for everything else they did that led to their present
predicament.
But it is not only pregnant minors who are harmed by judicial
bypass hearings, though they bear the brunt of it. The process also and
deeply discredits the legal system itself. The remainder of the Article
examines several ways in which this comes about. The first considers the
problem of sham hearings, and turns for illumination to a well known
example from the past: divorce hearings in the days before no-fault, when
married couples complied with the law’s demands for fault by telling stories
in court. This Part also considers the unhappy parallels between the current
bypass process and the hearings held by the House Un-American Activities
Committee (“HUAC”) in the late 1950s, whose purpose was less to
establish facts than to shame witnesses compelled to testify.
Of course not every bypass judge is out to harass or shame pregnant
girls. Many conscientiously attempt to apply the maturity standard to the
minors who appear before them. But in a number of counties and
courtrooms, judges are hostile to bypass cases and sometimes to the
petitioners themselves. Some judges have included moral verdicts within
their assessment of a minor’s maturity and others refuse to grant or even to
hear bypass cases at all. The result is an arbitrariness of access and outcome
that further discredits the legal system. As discussed in Part VI, forum
exclusion is particularly obnoxious to law’s legitimacy, producing a
disillusionment with law by and on behalf of pregnant young women who
are, after all, entitled to be heard.
I recognize that hearings for teenagers have always been
complicated by the nature of juvenile proceedings themselves, which are
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generally less formal than proceedings for adults and often flavored by the
sometimes paternalistic, sometimes disciplinary instincts of judges. This has
been especially true for girls, who were often brought to court for correction
for behavior relating to sexual unruliness.38 Bypass petitioners bring
themselves to court, but they too are often treated as though wayward. To
some extent this may be explained by institutional or generational
familiarity with the earlier ungovernability model as well as various
ongoing anxieties associated with girls in trouble. But this is not the entire
explanation in the bypass context. To understand how these hearings work,
it is necessary to look as well at the politics of abortion. How those politics
have made their way into the bypass process becomes clear in nearly every
section of this Article. How anti-abortion politics has made its way into the
election of judges is the special subject of Part VII.
II. JUDICIAL BYPASS HEARINGS
A. Origins
Thirty-four states now require that before a pregnant minor can
have an abortion, she must first either notify or get consent from her parents
(one or both, depending on the state)39 or successfully petition a judge at the
confidential hearing known as a judicial bypass hearing. The arrangement
results from a constitutional compromise concocted by the Supreme Court
in the 1979 case of Bellotti v. Baird.40 In Roe v. Wade, the Court had held
that a constitutionally protected right of privacy was “broad enough to
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her

38
Cheryl Hicks, “In Danger of Becoming Morally Depraved”: Single Black
Women, Working-Class Black Families, and New York State’s Wayward Minor Laws, 1917–
1928, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 2077, 2103 (2003) (citing MARY ODEM, DELINQUENT DAUGHTERS:
PROTECTING AND POLICING ADOLESCENT FEMALE SEXUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1885–
1920 159 (1995) (“[P]arents hoped that the court would help strengthen their flagging
authority over the social and sexual activities of their teenage daughters.”)).
39

Twenty-two states require parental consent, eleven require parental notification,
and four require both. See GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW OF
STATE ABORTION LAWS, OCT. 1, 2009, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/
statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf. The burden of notification is on the physician performing
the abortion, rather than the minor. And, in most states, the parents must sign a statement of
notification or consent which the minor then brings to her doctor.
40

Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).

422

Columbia Journal of Gender and Law

[Vol. 18:2

pregnancy.”41 But did the language of Roe regarding women’s decisions
include “little women” as well?
The answer emerged from a predictable collision between abortion
jurisprudence and parental rights. The Supreme Court has long upheld the
authority of parents to make decisions on behalf of their children, even in
areas of life about which a teenage child might well have an opinion.42 As
the Court explained in Bellotti, this decisional superiority derives from the
sum of several propositions: that children (in general) do not make sound
decisions; that parents (in general) will decide wisely on their behalf; and
that whether wise or not, parents have a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in raising their children as they see fit.43 At the same time, as the
Court had recognized in a 1967 juvenile delinquency proceeding, the
Constitution also applies to minors: “[W]hatever may be their precise
impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment or the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone.”44
The tension between conceptions of pregnant girls as juvenile rights
bearers and pregnant girls as daughters was squarely joined in the context of
abortion, and in Bellotti the Supreme Court worked out the “precise impact”
of Roe for girls. Acknowledging that “there are few situations in which
denying a minor the right to make an important decision will have
consequences so grave and indelible,”45 the Court held that as with pregnant
women, no one—not parent, not boyfriend, not whoever the father might
be—may have an absolute veto over a pregnant girl’s decision to abort. At
the same time, in consideration of children’s “peculiar vulnerability,” their
“inability to make critical decisions,” and the importance of the parental
41

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.113, 152 (1973).

42

The starting point is Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (discussing the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct upbringing and education of children under their
control. See generally Barbara Woodhouse, Who Owns this Child?: Meyer and Pierce and
the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992).
43

Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979).

44
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (extending to minors the rights to counsel, to
be informed of charges, and to a record in a juvenile proceeding). Minors have since
acquired other, qualified rights in such areas as criminal procedure, free speech, and in
certain aspects of procreative liberty, such as obtaining contraception. See Carey v.
Population Servs., 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (overturning New York’s ban on provision of
contraceptives to minors under sixteen). New York had argued that the ban furthered “the
State’s policy against promiscuous sexual intercourse among the young.” Id. at 692.
45

Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642.
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role in child rearing, states could condition a girl’s decision to abort on the
consent of her parents.46
In harmonizing these seemingly antithetical interests—the minor’s
right to choose and the parent’s right to control—the Court recognized that
pregnant teens, “especially those living at home,” are vulnerable to parental
efforts to obstruct their access to abortion.47 To avoid this de facto veto, the
Court concluded that minors must be given the opportunity to go directly to
court instead of involving their parents.48 In effect, the decision extends Roe
to minors provisionally.
Each year thousands of pregnant teenagers learn, whether by going
online, visiting a clinic, or through teenage word-of-mouth, that if they want
an abortion they must first have either a note from home or an order from
court. As we shall see, it is the cost to minors of getting the court order that
produces the misuse of law. Of course, not all states require parental
involvement. Several, such as New York, have no such legislation. In
others, such as California, Montana, and New Jersey, parental involvement
statutes have been found to burden a minor’s right to privacy under state
constitutions.49 But in the states that prefer parental involvement, the price
extracted is all the more unjustifiable because bypass hearings are not
required. In a much forgotten footnote in Bellotti v. Baird, the Court
observed that there is nothing sacrosanct about a judicial hearing as the
alternative to parental involvement, stating: “We do not suggest, however,
that a State choosing to require parental consent could not delegate the
46

Id. at 623, 634.

47

Id. at 647 (“It would be unrealistic, therefore, to assume that the mere existence
of a legal right to seek relief in superior court provides an effective avenue of relief for some
of those who need it the most.”).
48

Id. at 643–44. The Massachusetts statute challenged in Bellotti required parental
consent. While a number of states have consent requirements, others require only that
parents be notified of their daughter’s intent to abort, a seemingly milder form of parental
participation. Although the Supreme Court has never decided whether a bypass procedure is
required for notification-only statutes, every notification state but Utah has included a
judicial bypass provision and the Supreme Court has affirmed that this satisfies any
constitutional demands. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 454 (1990). The Fourth
Circuit has opined, however, that because notice is a less burdensome requirement than
consent, no bypass procedure would be required for its validity. Planned Parenthood of Blue
Ridge v. Camblos, 116 F.3d 707, 715–16 (4th Cir. 1997).
49

Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997); Lambert v.
Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997); Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620
(N.J. 2000), But see Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 716 So.2d 645 (Miss. 1998) (upholding
Mississippi’s two-parent consent law as constitutional under the State constitution).
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alternative procedure to a juvenile court or an administrative agency or
officer.”50 It will be useful to keep the court’s proviso in mind as the nature
of the hearings unfold.
B. Operation
1. The Petition
The bypass petition, or “application” in some states, generally
requires the minor to state her age, the fact of her pregnancy (and
sometimes an estimate of how pregnant she is), and, borrowing language
from Arizona’s form, an affirmation that she wants to “terminate her
pregnancy by abortion.”51 In all but two states, parental involvement laws
apply to all minors under the age of 18: Delaware sensibly exempts minors
over the age of sixteen,52 and West Virginia defines a minor for bypass
purposes as “any person under eighteen years who has not graduated from
high school.”53

50

Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643 n.22.

51
Ariz. Supreme Court, Abortion, Request by Minor Without Consent of Parent,
http://www.supreme.state.az.us/selfserv/abortion_forms.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2009)
(follow “Petition to Authorize Physician to Perform Abortion”). Some states require the
minor to specify the statutory grounds on which her petition is based. For example, in
Arizona she can check off the statement, “I am mature and capable of giving informed
consent to the proposed abortion,” or the statement, “It is in my best interests to have an
abortion without the consent of my parent(s), guardian, or conservator.” Id.; ARIZ. REV.
STAT. Ann. § 36–2152 (2009). In Texas, the minor must check one of three reasons why she
does not want to notify her parents: that she is “mature enough . . . and know[s] enough
about abortion to make this decision,” that telling her parent(s) is not in her best interests, or
that telling her parent(s) “may lead to [her] physical, sexual or emotional abuse.” Tex. Sup.
Ct., Promulgation of Forms for Use in Parental Notification Proceedings Under Chapter 33
of the Family Code, available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/MiscDocket/99/
99924300.pdf; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003 (Vernon 2009).
52

Parental Notice of Abortion Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1782 (6) (2009)
(defining a minor as “a female person under the age of 16”). Exempting teenagers 16 and
over makes good sense as at least a partial reform of bypass laws. With regard to many areas
of (more or less) adult life, such as working, leaving school, and engaging in consensual sex,
sixteen year olds are treated as adults. It would be useful to know as an empirical matter
whether judges, even sub silentio, take judicial notice of the fact that sixteen- and seventeenyear-olds are mature enough to make an abortion decision; in many courts the answer is
probably “Yes.”
53

W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-2 (2009).
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The petition forms differ from state to state and, in order to help
minors fill them out properly, a number of states provide instructions (in
Texas in both English and Spanish).54 The instructions typically respond to
the specific concerns of teenagers regarding such matters as costs (none),
confidentiality (promised), and the availability of legal assistance
(appointed).55 Private agencies, such as the Women’s Law Project in
Pennsylvania,56 Jane’s Due Process in Texas,57 and various Planned
Parenthood affiliates,58 also provide information on the legal requirements
for abortion. Staff at medical clinics, where many minors first learn that
their own consent is not enough, also provide such information.59 This
summary of assistance may paint too bright a picture of how the bypass
54

See Tex. Sup. Ct., Instructions for Applying to the Court for a Waiver of
Parental Notification: Parental Notification Rules and Forms, forms 2A, 2B (2007)
(promulgated pursuant to Tex. Fam. Code §§ 33.003[l], 33.004[c]), available at
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/rules/pnr/pnForms052308.pdf
(English
version),
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/rules/pnr/spanish33.pdf (Spanish version). The North
Carolina instructions explain legal vocabulary: “You ask the Court for a waiver by filing a
‘petition.’ . . . The ‘petition’ is a form that is available in the office of the Clerk of Superior
Court in every county courthouse.” Administrative Office of the Courts, Petition For Waiver
Of
Parental
Consent,
AOC-J-601
INS
(2004),
available
at
http://forms.lp.findlaw.com/form/courtforms/state/nc/nc000452.pdf. North Carolina requires
that “the minor . . . [be] given assistance in preparing and filing the petition.” Parental or
Judicial Consent for Abortion, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.8 (2009). While this type of
assistance is helpful, experienced professional guidance is often crucial, as court personnel
are not always knowledgeable in how to go about the process.
55
The Texas materials pose and answer three primary questions: what are my
choices, besides abortion; what are the dangers of having an abortion; and what is it
important for me to know about the Abortion Parental Notification Law. Tex. Sup. Ct., supra
note 54. The materials may also explain what happens after a petition is filed: “The clerk will
set a time for you to meet with a judge. This meeting is called a ‘hearing.’” Id. North
Carolina, Bypass Form, http://forms.lp.findlaw.com/form/courtforms/state/nc/nc000452.pdf
(last visited Oct. 1, 2009).
56

WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT, YOUNG WOMEN’S GUIDE TO ABORTION IN
PENNSYLVANIA (2009), available at http://www.womenslawproject.org/brochures/
wlp_teen_piece.pdf.
57

Jane’s
Due
Process,
About
Judicial
Bypass,
http://www.janesdueprocess.org/teens/legalrights/judicialbypass (last visited Oct. 1, 2009).
58
Planned
Parenthood,
Judicial
Bypass
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/rocky-mountains/judicial-bypass-faq-10564.htm
visited Oct. 1, 2009).
59
NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, THE JUDICIAL BYPASS: REPORT
MEETING 8 (2008) (on file with author).
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ON A

426

Columbia Journal of Gender and Law

[Vol. 18:2

process works in fact. While in some jurisdictions courts and agencies help
minors in the initial stages of the process, in others the advice handed out
from court personnel, from clerks to judges, has been inept, inconsistent,
morally tinged, or nonexistent.60
After a petition has been filed, unrepresented minors are put in
touch with a court-appointed or volunteer lawyer. Here, too, follow-through
is often lacking or mismanaged, even in states like Tennessee that
specifically provide for the appointment of trained advocates.61
2. Procedural Features
In deciding that bypass hearings accommodated the application of
Roe to minors, the Supreme Court provided a blueprint of sorts, which
emphasized the constitutional significance of two aspects of the process:
anonymity and speed.62 Without the assurance of anonymity, the minor
might be found out by her parents and prevented from petitioning a court or
seeing a doctor: the de facto veto.63 Without the assurance of speed, she
might be timed out of the safest methods of early abortion or perhaps lose
the right altogether.64 It may be helpful to think of minors as possessing
twinned rights: the right to decide whether or not to have an abortion and
60

See HELENA SILVERSTEIN, GIRLS ON THE STAND: HOW COURTS FAIL PREGNANT
MINORS 52 (2008) (reporting that “[f]orty percent of Alabama courts, just over 45 percent of
Tennessee courts, and a whopping 73 percent of Pennsylvania courts proved inadequately
acquainted with their responsibilities”).
61
Helena Silverstein et al., Judicial Waivers of Parental Consent for Abortion:
Tennessee’s Troubles Putting Policy into Practice, 27 LAW & POL’Y 399, 412–17 (2005).
62

Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979) (“[Bypass hearings] must assure that
a resolution of the issue, and any appeals that may follow, will be completed with anonymity
and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be
obtained.”). Some states have stuck to the bare bones of the structure sketched in Bellotti,
while others, like Texas, have produced significantly more detailed rules and guidelines. See,
e.g., Ann Crawford McClure et al., A Guide to Proceedings Under the Texas Parental
Notification Statute and Rules, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 755 (2000). Written by experts on Texas
procedure, the article was intended as a technical guide for lawyers and judges implementing
the state’s bypass legislation. Id. at 759.
63
Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 644 (“In sum, the procedure must ensure that the provision
requiring parental consent does not in fact amount to [an] ‘absolute, and possibly arbitrary,
veto.’”).
64

trimester).

Id. at 651 n.31 (noting that abortions are most accessible during the first
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the right to seek a judicial bypass of parental involvement. The second
effectuates the first.
i. Anonymity
The demands of anonymity are met in a number of ways. In all
states, petitions are captioned by initials or under Jane Doe or Anonymous
aliases. 65 The hearings are closed to the public,66 although petitioners may
bring a relative or friend for support.
Minors are informed that the petition is confidential. North
Carolina, among other states, alerts minors to an important exception: as
mandated reporters, judges must report instances of rape or incest to the
Department of Social Services.67
Individual states have put other practical safeguards in place. Most
provide that a minor can designate by what means she (or someone else on
her behalf) should be contacted regarding the hearing date, ruling, or any
other official communication such as an appeal.68 Cell phones, beepers, and
65

See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.904(2) (a) (2009) (requiring that the probate
court “upon its first contact with a minor seeking a waiver . . . provide [her] with notice of
[her] right to . . . [c]onfidentiality of the proceedings, including the right to use initials in the
petition”). States use different methods to keep track of the true identity of petitioners.
Arizona, for example, permits the petition to be signed by a true name, initials, or fictitious
name; the petition is accompanied by a “Data Sheet” which states the minor’s true name if
she has used an alias. 2009 ARIZ. LEGIS. SERV., ch. 172 (H.B. 2564) (West), to be codified at
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2152[B],[E], petition and data sheet available at
http://www.supreme.state.az.us/selfserv/Abortion%20Forms/DataSheet.pdf. Texas uses a
similar system: a cover page with a Jane Doe designation and a “verification page” with the
minor’s actual name. See, e.g., Tex. Sup. Ct., Parental Notification Rules and Forms, Rule 2,
Proceedings in the Trial Court (2007), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/
rules/pdf/SCAC_Chapter_33_Rules_Forms.pdf.
66
See, e.g., Tex. Sup. Ct., supra note 54, at Form 1A (“[t]he only persons allowed
to be [at your hearing] are you, your guardian ad litem, your lawyer, court staff, and any
person whom you request to be there. . . . No one [except the court] can inspect the
evidence.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.904(2) (g) (2009). It is not uncommon for a
minor to bring a parent. See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 678 So.2d 783 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996)
(petitioner’s mother accompanied her daughter to the hearing, even though the mother’s
religious beliefs prevented her from consenting to the abortion). In that case the mother also
testified that she would take her daughter for the abortion and care for her during her
recovery. The trial court denied the petition. Id. at 784.
67
68

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.8 (f) (2009)

The Texas instructions explain that “you may list a phone, pager, beeper, or fax
number, or other way that you can be contacted,” emphasizing that “[i]t is very important
that you provide this information because the court may later need to contact you about your
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pagers have helped greatly in this regard. Minors have also been alerted to
be mindful of their computer history. 69 In Texas, if a bypass petition is filed
by fax, court personnel are required to “take all reasonable steps” to
maintain its confidentiality so that the form does not sit out on the office fax
machine.70 Heightened concern regarding the confidentiality of the forms is
well justified, as in some states, the petitions or accompanying
documentation may contain facts about the minor’s history (or fear) of
abuse or incest, the date of conception, and the date and location of her
intended abortion.71 Publicity around any of these might put a minor or her
plans at risk.
ii. Speed
Time is a critical factor in the bypass context. As the Ninth Circuit
explained, “if the abortion decision is hindered or burdened during the
earlier stages of pregnancy, the performance of an abortion may be delayed
until such time as the state can more extensively regulate the exercise of a
woman’s constitutional right.”72 The requirements of timeliness are met in a
number of ways. Bypass petitions typically receive docketing priority on
court calendars. In addition, most states have prescribed maximum periods
during which a ruling on the petition must be handed down.73 In
application. If you cannot be contacted, your application will be denied.” Tex. Sup. Ct.,
supra note 54.
69

Jane’s Due Process advises minors trying to learn about pregnancy options: “If
someone might check to see what you’ve been doing online, it’s safest to use a computer at a
friend’s house, library, or other place that you trust to keep your information private.” Jane’s
Due Process, Homepage, http://www.janesdueprocess.org/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2009).
70

McClure et al., supra note 62, at 800 (describing Rule 1.5(a)).

71

See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.152 (2008); IOWA CT. RULES 8.34, JUVENILE
PROCEDURE FORM 1, available at http://www.iowacourts.gov/wfdata/frame2943-1593/
File5.pdf.
72

Glick v. McKay, 937 F.2d 434, 441 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that, because
Nevada’s parental notification law did not specify a fixed time period, it failed to meet the
expediency requirement established in Akron II and Bellotti), overruled on other grounds by
Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997).
73

See Causeway Med. Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096, 1109–10 (5th Cir. 1997)
(Louisiana’s failure to set an outside time limit for the juvenile court’s ruling or to provide
constructive authorization in the absence of a ruling failed to provide the expeditious
proceedings required by Bellotti); Ind. Planned Parenthood Affiliates Ass’n. v. Pearson, 716
F.2d. 1127, 1135–37 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that because an Indiana statute failed to
mention the appellate process at all, expeditious consideration of appeals was not “assured”).
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Mississippi, it is no more than seventy-two hours after the petition is filed;74
in North Carolina, no more than seven days.75 A judge’s failure to rule
within the specified time (the “pocket veto”) results in a default judgment
granting the petition.76 Such default or “deemed granted” provisions can be
tremendously important in counties where judges are reluctant to be
associated with successful bypass petitions.77
Despite these schedules, in states that grant maximum periods for
trial court and appellate decisions, it can take up to three full weeks from
filing the petition to the court’s final ruling.78 This is a significant period in
the context of pregnancy. Requiring any woman seeking an abortion to
remain pregnant for three additional weeks after her decision has been made
may well have both medical and psychological implications for her.79
3. Maturity and Best Interest Standards
Bypass judges are charged with resolving two basic questions.80
The first is whether the petitioning minor has proven that she is mature and
informed enough to make an abortion decision. If the judge finds that she
has, he must grant her petition. If the judge finds that she has not, then he
must resolve a second question: even if the minor’s decisional competence
is lacking, is an abortion nonetheless in her best interest? If the answer to
74

MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-55(3) (2009).

75

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.8(d) (2009).

76

See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.8(d) (2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-55 (3)

(2009).
77
NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, supra note 59, at 15 (discussing the
electoral and moral difficulties faced by many judges and describing how a judge could
publicly “refuse to sign an order . . . knowing that, in a short period of time, it would be
granted”).
78

Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 514 (1990)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Ohio’s judicial-bypass procedure can consume up to three
weeks of a young woman’s pregnancy.”); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.85(B) (1)
(2009) (requiring the trial court to make its decision within five business days after the minor
files her complaint); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2505.073(A) (2009) (requiring the court of
appeals to docket an appeal within four days after the minor files a notice of appeal); OHIO
RULE APP. PROC. 14(A) (requiring the court of appeals to render a decision within five days
after docketing the appeal).
79

I thank Imogen Goold for this insight.

80

Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647–48 (1979).
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this question is yes, the judge must grant the petition. If the judge thinks an
abortion is not in her best interests, the minor’s petition is denied. At this
point, putting aside an appeal, the petitioner who has been deemed too
immature to decide to have an abortion is left by law to have a baby.
What standards do courts use to determine whether a minor is
mature? As the Supreme Court noted in Bellotti, maturity is “difficult to
define, let alone determine. . . . The peculiar nature of the abortion decision
requires . . . a case-by-case evaluation.”81 Some states have provided trial
judges with statutory guidance. Pennsylvania provides that “the court shall
hear evidence relating to the maturity, intellect and understanding of the
pregnant woman, the fact and duration of her pregnancy, the nature,
possible consequences and alternatives to abortion, and any other evidence
the court may find useful.”82 Texas also focuses on the process by which a
decision is reached: its Supreme Court held that “the evidence [must]
demonstrate[] that the minor is capable of reasoned decision-making and
that her decision is not the product of impulse, but is based upon the careful
consideration of the various options open to her and the benefits, risks, and
consequences of those options.”83 As to whether a minor is “sufficiently
well informed,” the Texas criteria are typical: the minor must show that she
has learned about medical risks from a health care professional, understands
those risks, knows there are alternatives to abortion, and is aware of its
emotional and psychological implications.84
Despite the articulation of general standards, there is significant
discretion in their application. In explaining the vast discrepancies in bypass
81

Id. at 644.

82

18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3206(f) (2009). See also Satsie Veith, The Judicial Bypass
Procedure and Adolescents’ Abortion Rights: The Fallacy of the ‘Maturity’ Standard, 23
HOFSTRA L. REV. 453 (1994).
83

In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 255 (Tex. 2000). As to whether a minor is
“sufficiently well informed,” Texas requires a showing that the minor has obtained
information about health risks from a health care professional and understands them, that she
understands the alternatives to abortion, and that she is aware of the emotional and
psychological implications of abortion. Id. See also In re Anonymous 964 So.2d 1239 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2007) (affirming denial of petition of minor whose testimony “did not indicate that
she had discussed with a doctor, a nurse, or a counselor any potential psychological or
emotional problems that might arise after having an abortion”). But see In re Doe, 19 S.W.
3d 249, 259 (Tex. 2000) (information about the psychological consequences of abortion need
not be received from licensed professional counselors so long as it is from “reliable and
informed sources”).
84

Id. at 256.
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outcomes by county, one Ohio judge noted simply: “My view of maturity is
not someone else’s view of maturity.” Ohio bypass attorney Alphonse
Gerhardstein put it slightly differently: “We’re starved for standards
because everyone thinks they have the answer.”85
If a minor is found to be insufficiently mature or informed, how do
courts determine her best interests? In some states, the question is whether
an abortion—full stop—is in the immature minor’s best interest. Other
states put the question differently and ask whether an abortion without
notification to a parent is in the best interests of the minor. Thus, in a
Nebraska case, a thirteen-year-old who “lives with her parents, has never
lived on her own, and has never handled her personal finances or held
employment other than a summer job detasseling corn” failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that she was sufficiently mature, or that an
abortion without notifying her parents would be in her best interest.86 But
under either formulation, the answer in almost every published case has
been no.
As with maturity, the standards for best interests are also quite
roomy. The Florida Supreme Court has listed among the factors to be
considered:
the minor’s emotional or physical needs; the possibility of
intimidation, other emotional injury, or physical danger to the
minor; the stability of the minor’s home and the possibility that
notification would cause serious and lasting harm to the family
structure; the relationship between the parents and the minor and
the effect of notification on that relationship; and the possibility
that notification may lead the parents to withdraw emotional and
financial support from the minor.87

Some states have urged common sense in the application of
standards. A Kansas court cautioned that “the examining court must weigh
85

See Catherine Candisky & Randall Edwards, Abortion Waivers are a Judicial
Crapshoot, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 29, 1993, at 1A [hereinafter Candisky &
Edwards, Abortion Waivers]; Steven F. Stuhlbarg, When is a Pregnant Minor Mature? When
is an Abortion in her Best Interests? The Ohio Supreme Court Applies Ohio’s Abortion
Parental Notification Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 907 (1992); see also Suellyn Scarneccia &
Julie Kunce Fields, Judging Girls: Decision Making in Parental Consent to Abortion Cases,
3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 75, 98–101 (1995) (proposing a set of standardized questions for
judges in Michigan).
86

In re Anonymous I, 558 N.W.2d. 784, 788 (Neb. 1997) (per curiam).

87

In re Doe, 973 So.2d 548, 553 (Fla. Ct. App. 2008).
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[the minor’s] situation not against the ideal but against a standard of basic
understanding of her situation, her choices, and her options.”88
4. Burden of Proof and Standard of Review
A critical issue for trial court judges is whether the petitioning
minor, as the moving party, has met the burden of proof regarding her
maturity or best interests.89 (Keep in mind that the minor is also the only
party.)90 Most states have adopted the “preponderance of the evidence” test
typically used in civil actions.91 Yet other states, like Nebraska and Arizona,
apply the higher “clear and convincing” standard.92 There seems to be a
sense in these states that girls “have it easy” going into a bypass hearing,
which an Arizona court characterized as “a proceeding that encroaches on a
parent’s ability to exercise [traditional authority]” over a child.93 In the case
of In re B.S., the Arizona Court of Appeals explained that because minors
are both unopposed and represented by counsel, the higher standard
“avoid[s] making judicial bypass a mere pass-through proceeding.”94 In
addition, the Arizona court explained that the “magnitude of the presented
issue” justified departing from the normal preponderance standard, because
abortion involves “intensely personal interests,” granting the petition (too
88

In re Doe, 866 P.2d 1069, 1074 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994).

89

See Ohio v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (upholding
an Ohio statute placing a clear and convincing burden of proof on the minor). Where state
statutes have been silent on the burden of proof, courts have assigned it to minors, noting
that Akron simply follows the general rule in civil cases that the party asserting the
affirmative of an issue bears the burden of proving it. See In re B.S., 74 P.3d 285, 289 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2003); see also In re Anonymous 1, 558 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Neb. 1997); In re
Anonymous, 833 So. 2d 75, 78 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002); In re Jane Doe IV, 19 S.W.3d 337,
339 (Tex. 2000).
90

The exception is Alabama, where one judge has appointed a guardian ad litem
for the fetus. Helena Silverstein, In the Matter of Anonymous, a Minor: Fetal Representation
in Hearings to Waive Parental Consent for Abortion, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 69, 77–
80 (2001) [hereinafter Silverstein, Anonymous].
91

See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003 (i) (2009).

92
In re Anonymous 1, 558 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Neb. 1997); In re B.S., 74 P.3d 285,
289 (Ariz. 2003).
93

In re B.S., 74 P.3d at 290.

94
Id. at 289 (citing Akron Center, 497 U.S. at 516 (allowing the clear and
convincing standard “when, as here, the bypass procedure contemplates an Ex parte
proceeding at which no one opposes the minor’s testimony”)).
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easily) would have “irreversible consequences” for the minor.95 Of course,
not granting the petition also has irreversible consequences that are
intensely personal, and about which the minor has already made a decision.
Nonetheless, the court’s explanations reveal how judicial attitudes about
abortion permeate even the procedural aspects of the bypass process.
As with the burden of proof, the sense that bypass petitioners have
an abundance of procedural advantages has influenced courts in other
matters as well. In 2001, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed an earlier
decision that undisputed bypass testimony must be accepted as true, noting
that “where a minor seeks a waiver of parental consent for an abortion and
no adverse party cross-examines her . . . a rule compelling acceptance of
undisputed live testimony as true—without affording any deference to the
trial court’s ability to . . . assess the demeanor of the witness—is
unsound.”96 There is no adverse party in a bypass hearing because of its
distinctive constitutionally constituted nature, although, as we shall see,
some judges do examine petitioners in a prosecutorial manner.
In most states the standard of review on appeal is abuse of
discretion: a denial will be reversed only when the trial court’s decision is
“plainly erroneous or manifestly unjust.”97 Here too abortion politics flavor
what this means. As a dissenting Alabama judge candidly stated,
“[r]eligious opposition to abortion in this state is so pervasive and
intransigent that we need a standard of review on appeal that will
differentiate effectively between those judgments based on the evidence and
the law and those based on nonjudicial factors.”98
C. Outcomes and the Nature of Harm
Since bypass hearings were first introduced in the late 1970s,
petitions have been denied for reasons that, on any fair reading of the facts,
are simply hard to take. In 2001, an Alabama judge held that because sex
education was taught in the public high school, the minor’s “action[s] in
becoming pregnant . . . [are] indicative that she has not acted in a mature
and well informed manner”;99 another minor was declared immature
95

Id.

96

Ex parte Anonymous, 803 So.2d 542, 546 (Ala. 2001) (emphasis added).

97

Id. at 547.

98

Ex parte Anonymous, 812 So.2d 1234, 1240 (2001) (Johnstone, J., dissenting).

99
In re Anonymous, 684 So. 2d 1337, 1338 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996). An Ohio trial
court similarly denied the petition of a minor who was days away from her eighteenth
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because “she engaged in sexual intercourse ‘with her [college] scholarship
on the line.’”100 A Mississippi court denied the bypass petition of a collegebound seventeen-year-old, who testified that she would not be able to give
up a baby for adoption because she had lost her own mother to cancer five
years earlier, on the grounds that the girl was “simply afraid of the
responsibility of motherhood.”101 A Texas trial court turned down the
petition of a seventeen year old who had researched abortion and its
alternatives, had consulted with several counselors (including her home
economics teacher and three formerly pregnant teenagers), and had chosen
to look at the fetus on an ultrasound in order to confront her decision
directly, on the grounds that “she did not understand the intrinsic benefits of
keeping the child or of adoption.”102 An Ohio court found that a minor who
already had one child lacked maturity because she had failed to file a
paternity action against that child’s father.103 (There is at present no
exemption for teens who are already mothers; they too must notify or get
consent from their own parents.)104 An Alabama court denied the petition of
a seventeen-year-old cheerleader who supported herself with a full-time job
and who had testified that she was “emotionally and mentally prepared [for
an abortion], and if there were any complications she would go immediately
to her doctor.”105 As a frustrated appellate judge remarked in a similar case,
birthday, taking college preparatory classes, and working to save for college on the grounds
that her pregnancy alone indicated insufficient maturity. In re Jane Doe, 613 N.E.2d 1112,
1114–1115 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
100

In re Anonymous, 905 So.2d 845, 848 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (upholding trial
court decision). The court also based its ruling on the fact that “seeing the difficulties
encountered by friends who have become pregnant, [the petitioner] got ‘herself into the same
situation.’” Id.
101

In re A.W., 826 So.2d 1280, 1282 (Miss. 2002).

102

In re Jane Doe, 19 S.W.3d 346, 358 (Tex. 2000).

103

Cleveland Surgi-Center Inc. v. Jones, 2 F.3d 686, 689 (6th Cir. 1993), cert
denied, 510 U.S. 1046 (1994).
104
The exemption of pregnant teenage mothers from parental involvement laws is
an area overripe for reform. If anyone knows what is at stake in a decision to have a child, it
is surely mothers. See Rachel K. Jones et al., “I Would Want to Give My Child, Like,
Everything in the World”: How Issues of Motherhood Influence Women Who Have
Abortions, 29 J. FAM. ISSUES 79, 80 (2008). There is some irony in holding that a young
mother is too immature to make an abortion decision about having another child; she is, after
all, already legally responsible for all decisions regarding the children she already has. See
Emily Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors, 48 BUFFALO L. REV. 785 (2000).
105

In re Anonymous, 650 So. 2d. 923, 925 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994).
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“[w]e can safely say, having considered the record, that, should this minor
not meet the criteria for ‘maturity’ under the statute, it is difficult to imagine
one who would.”106 These cases remind one of the old southern literacy
tests designed to keep black citizens from registering to vote. As a fiftyseven year old farmer, who tried unsuccessfully to register in 1954 and
1961 and then gave up, told an interviewer, he “had done his best and does
not think that he could do any better.”107
In none of the bypass cases just discussed did the trial court decide
that despite finding the minor was immature, an abortion was in her best
interest. And while some of these cases were reversed on appeal, not all
cases are reversed, or are even appealed. As Malcolm Feeley has pointed
out in the criminal context, in terms of the significance for the individual,
“for all practical purposes, the lower courts of first instance are also courts
of last resort.”108 The result in many bypass cases is that by the end of the
formal hearing, girls deemed to lack the maturity to decide about abortion
are thrown back on those same resources to proceed toward motherhood.
Of course, we do not know the actual end to bypass cases. Minors
whose petitions are granted may change their minds, as certain Alabama
judges regularly urge petitioners in that state. 109 Nor can we be certain what
happens when a petition is denied—whether disappointed young women try
again in another court or another state,110 whether they travel to a nonbypass state, or whether they become mothers. We know very little about
what happens to the girls in this last category: whether they continue to live
at home, or raise their babies by themselves, or marry, or place their
children up for adoption.
Ungrounded denials of bypass petitions of the sort described
above—decisions in which judges declare well-informed young women
immature for the purpose of defeating their decision to abort—excite our
sense of injustice. The decisions appear to be stubborn misapplications of
106

In re Anonymous, 515 So.2d 1254, 1256 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987).

107
Brian K. Landsberg, Sumpter County, Alabama and the Origins of the Voting
Rights Act, 54 ALA. L. REV. 877, 904 (2003).
108

FEELEY, supra note 34, at 33.

109

Silverstein, Anonymous, supra note 90, at 99–100.

110
The Sixth Circuit has upheld the filing of sequential petitions. In Cincinnati
Women’s Servs. Inc. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 2006), the Court held that an Ohio
parental consent statute limiting a minor to a single petition unduly burdened a minor whose
circumstances changed such that she would be able to meet requirements of demonstrating
increased maturity or increased medical knowledge. Id. at 369–71.
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the standards by judges who may disapprove of abortion, disapprove of the
young woman, or perhaps both. But although these unprincipled denials rile
us up, they also serve to divert our attention from an aspect of the process
that is as troubling and far more pervasive.111 This is the set of harms
inflicted on young women whose petitions are approved and who by that
measure might be considered bypass success stories. Over the last twenty
years, appellate courts have clarified the meaning of statutory standards so
that fewer judges are able to disregard the record without being reversed on
appeal. The result is that in most states, almost all girls willing to go to
court can, in the long run, get judicial permission to have the abortions they
seek.
But if nearly all bypass petitioners succeed, where is the harm?
Proponents of California’s 2008 parental involvement ballot measure
insisted in their campaign materials that “out of millions of girls, the
opposition [to Proposition 4] couldn’t find ONE REAL GIRL harmed by a
notification law.”112 Moreover, if bypass hearings are here to stay—as the
Supreme Court has repeatedly and grumpily assured us is constitutionally
the case113—perhaps the present state of affairs is not so bad from a
practical perspective. Yes, there must be a hearing, but apparently most
girls are able to negotiate their way through one, and sooner or later their
111

A five-year study of Minnesota bypass hearings revealed that out of 3,573
petitions, nine were denied, six were withdrawn, and 3,558 were granted. Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 436 n.21 (1990). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
noted in 1997 that judicial approval is nearly a certainty. Out of 15,000 cases in
Massachusetts heard by the year 2000, only 13 were denied and 11 of those were reversed on
appeal. See Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Att’y Gen., 677 N.E.2d 101, 105 (Mass.
1997). Planned Parenthood reports that during 2007, in six of its regional offices (the Rocky
Mountains, Southeast Virginia, Bucks County and Central Pennsylvania, and Mid and South
Michigan), out of 150 bypass petitions sought, none were denied. Richard Blum, Planned
Parenthood, Judicial Bypass, Dec. 10, 2008 (presentation on file with author).
112

League of Women Voters of California Education Fund, Proposition 4,
http://www.smartvoter.org/2008/11/04/ca/state/prop/4/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2009). Opponents
of Prop 4 suggested that girls who faced telling abusive parents might attempt illegal
abortions, or even suicide. Id. See also Sarah’s Law, Yes on 4, http://www.yeson4.net/ (last
visited Oct. 1, 2009).
113
As the Court noted in summarily rejecting a constitutional challenge to a
parental involvement statute in Casey, “[w]e have been over most of this ground before.”
Planned Parenthood Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992). In contrast, in a number of
states, such as Montana, Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997), California, Am.
Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997), and New Jersey, Planned
Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620 (N.J. 2000), parental involvement statutes
have been found to burden a minor’s right to privacy.
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petitions are granted. The hurdle is high, but if most can clear it, what’s the
problem? What more is there to think about?
I suggest that there is a great deal more to think about, for it is the
hearings themselves, and not just their outcomes, that are the misuse of law.
Some of the harms faced by minors are concrete, such as the immediate
problems of delay and public exposure. Other harms are less tangible, if no
less important. These are the consequences to a vulnerable young person of
compulsory participation in a high stakes hearing regarded by some as the
price she has to pay.
III. HARM TO MINORS
A great deal is put at stake by a minor’s participation in the bypass
process. In addition to whether or not the minor is to become a mother, this
Section looks at the risks to her health, her well-being, and to her dignity.
A. The Risks of Delay
The medical consequences of delay are more serious in the case of
teenagers, who already tend to acknowledge and confirm their pregnancies
later than adults.114 We understand the mix of causes: irregular periods,
teenage denial and procrastination skills, and the childlike hope for a
miracle. Nonetheless, the additional delay generated by the hearing (and
possible appeal) means that some girls may have to undergo more elaborate
abortion procedures and others risk being timed out of a legal abortion
altogether.115 After the Alabama Supreme Court remanded a case giving the
trial judge twelve more days to “detail sufficiently the basis for appropriate
findings” by conducting another hearing,116 Justice Johnstone observed that
“the mind-set of the trial court apparent from the record forebodes that a
remand will not yield a different judgment but only a more legally sufficient
114

See generally Am. Acad. of Pediatricians, Committee on Adolescence, The
Adolescent’s Right to Confidential Care When Considering Abortion, 97 PEDIATRICS 746,
749 (1996).
115

The nature of the abortion procedure has additional logistical implications.
Clinics typically require an adult to pick up any patient if anesthesia is used; this necessarily
complicates arranging transportation or accompaniment. NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN &
FAMILIES, supra note 59, at 5. For an excellent account of how teenagers help one another by
driving, waiting, being kind, see PATRICIA HERSCH, A TRIBE APART: A JOURNEY INTO THE
HEART OF AMERICAN ADOLESCENCE, 194–205 (1999).
116

Ex parte Anonymous, 889 So.2d 518, 520 (Ala. 2003).
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rationale for denying relief. All the while the time for a safe abortion will be
ticking by.”117
The importance of timing is not lost on minors. A Texas teenager
who could have avoided a hearing by waiting just a few weeks until her
eighteenth birthday instead petitioned the court to secure an abortion at the
earliest stage of her pregnancy.118 In reversing the trial court’s denial of her
petition before publishing its full opinion, the Texas Supreme Court
explained that “Doe was entitled to a bypass and out of concern that any
further delay might expose her further [medical] risk . . . [w]e made our
decision [to issue the order immediately] on the side of the minor’s
safety.”119
Worries over the cost of an abortion may also deter a minor from
acting. A Pennsylvania minor in foster care delayed petitioning because of
“confusion among staff” in the Department of Human Services (her
custodian) as to whether it would pay for an abortion.120 Once advised the
Department would pay, the minor immediately filed, but her petition was
denied on the grounds that, medical evidence notwithstanding, her
pregnancy was too developed.121 Though it was reversed on appeal, the case
underscores the crucial significance for law of timing and dates. As the
Women’s Law Project in Philadelphia counsels teens, “[d]o not delay
calling for an appointment just because you haven’t raised the full fee.”122
The Pennsylvania case also highlights the particular problems of
pregnant minors in state care. Florida policy forbids social workers from
authorizing an abortion for anyone under the supervision of the Department
of Child and Family Services.123 Because most foster children are unable or
117
Id. at 520. (Johnstone, J., concurring). Justice Johnstone concurred because “a
remand leaves [the minor] with a theoretical hope” and “will allow [her] further opportunity
to introduce even more evidence of her maturity, knowledge, and best interests.” Id.
118

In re Jane Doe, 19 S.W.3d 346, 356 n.11 (Tex. 2000).

119

Id. at 354.

120

In re L.D.F., 820 A.2d 714, 715 (Pa. 2003).

121

Id.
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WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT, supra note 56, at 2. A few private organizations
attempt to fund abortions for indigent women, young and old; for more, see National
Network of Abortion Funds, Connecting Rights to Resources, http://www.nnaf.org/ (last
visited Oct. 1, 2009).
123
Carl Hiaasen, DCF Policy: Forcing Babies to Have Babies, MIAMI HERALD,
May 1, 2005, at 1L (commenting on case of L.G.); see also Ex parte Anonymous, 531 So. 2d
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unwilling to involve their actual parents, the inability of foster parents or
social workers to consent places a near impossible burden on a minor’s
access to abortion. Other categories of pregnant teenagers find themselves
similarly stymied. These include both minors living informally with
grandparents or other relatives124 and minors whose parents are physically
absent—whether in prison, in the armed services, or in another country—
and therefore may be unable to participate in a timely way. Other parents
may be present in the United States illegally and afraid to sign an official
paper, especially one that must be notarized.125
The problem of delay is intensified by the operation of bypass
process itself. As the painstaking state-by-state investigations of Helena
Silverstein have made clear, in many counties the official players in the
system, from court clerks to judges, often know very little about the
hearings: what they are, what the state is obligated to provide, how minors
are to proceed, and so on.126 Within any one state, practices often differ
county to county, courthouse to courthouse, and judge to judge, further
complicating the ability of lawyers to prepare their clients.
There is also the sheer difficulty of actually getting to court. Judges
have heard testimony from petitioners who hitchhiked 40 miles over the
course of four hours to get to the hearing on time. As one lawyer stated,
“it’s difficult enough for a young woman to have to get out of school, come
to a lawyer, get to the courthouse by 4:30 p.m. (usually earlier so we can
catch a judge) and [to] do that a couple of times before the process is
finished; so I can’t even imagine if they have to drive 300 miles.”127
This account puts to the side the difficulties of arranging and
traveling to an abortion provider once a petition is granted.128 Consider that,
in Nebraska, the only three medical clinics that provide abortions in the
901 (Ala. 1988) (reviewing state foster care agency’s refusal to authorize a minor’s
abortion).
124
See, e.g., In re R.B., 790 So.2d 830 (Miss. 2001) (upholding the denial of a
waiver of parental consent where the minor’s parents were dead and she was living with her
grandmother); In re Anonymous, 812 So.2d 1221 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (upholding the
denial of a waiver where the minor’s grandmother was her legal guardian).
125

NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, supra note 59, at 10–12.

126

See generally SILVERSTEIN, supra note 60. Silverstein acknowledges that things
may have improved since she began her study. Id.
127

Id. at 5.

128

Id.
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state are 450 miles or more from the state’s western border; that two thirds
of Georgia’s providers are in Atlanta; and that Michigan has no providers
above the thumb.129
The is also much we cannot consider because we simply don’t
know. The fact that most petitions are granted tells us almost nothing at all
about how many girls are unable to petition in a timely way or who they
are: their age, race, education, and family circumstances. We do know,
however, that there are states, such as Mississippi, which have high teenage
pregnancy rates and low teenage abortion rates, and where only a few
bypass petitions are filed annually.130
B. The Risk of Public Exposure
Despite the constitutional significance of anonymity, a minor’s
physical participation in the bypass process puts her at risk of exposure. As
the New Jersey Supreme Court noted in striking down that state’s parental
notification law, the logistics of traveling to court, getting the forms,
returning for the hearing, and waiting around outside the courtroom may
compromise the young woman’s anonymity.131 Co-members of the
community appearing in court to pay a parking fine or take out a hunting
license may wonder what Jane is doing down there in the middle of the day.
Bypass petitioners have bumped into schoolmates attending their own
juvenile court hearings and parents have received anonymous letters from
neighbors who saw their daughter in court.132 In this regard, the availability
of electronic forms and instructions is a huge help to minors—at least
minors with printers—who can avoid the additional trip. It is worth noting
that even minors who involve their parents cannot do so completely within

129

Id. at 4.

130
Telephone Interview with Rachel Rebouché, Associate Director, Judicial
Bypass Protect, National Partnership for Women & Families (Sept. 29, 2009) (on file with
author).
131
132

Planned Parenthood of N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620, 636 (N.J. 2000).

Id. In Massachusetts, minors are at the courthouse for approximately two hours
and before a judge for between fifteen and thirty minutes; this is not an insubstantial time to
have to account for one’s activities. Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Att’y Gen., 677
N.E.2d 101, 105 n.6 (Mass. 1997).
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the confines of family privacy; at least six states require that parental
signatures on notification and consent forms must also be notarized.133
There is also the ethically charged problem of what I call
“revelation through appeal.” This occurs when an appellate opinion
incorporates so much factual information from the trial record that despite
the Jane Doe alias, the petitioner’s identity is susceptible to discovery. The
problem of the decision itself compromising anonymity was the subject of
ferocious debate among the justices of the Texas Supreme Court.
Concurring in a 2000 bypass case, Justice Enoch challenged Justice Hecht
for his “routine practice of revealing to the public ‘in complete detail’ the
minor’s testimony . . . for no apparent jurisprudential purpose.”134 Justice
Enoch observed that, in a series of decisions, Hecht had written separately
in order to “publish chapter and verse the minor’s confidential testimony. It
would appear that Justice Hecht intends nothing more than to punish, as
best he personally can, minors for seeking a judicial bypass. Although the
law promises them confidentiality, he promises them notoriety.”135
It is important to remember what is at stake in abortion notoriety. It
is not only that a minor’s parents may prevent her from going to a court or
to a clinic. As Judge Richard Posner noted in refusing to release even the
redacted medical records of late-term abortion patients, “skillful
‘Googlers’” might be able to “put two and two together, ‘out’ the . . .
women, and thereby expose them to threats, humiliation, and obloquy.”136
Similar concern was raised by the Fourth Circuit in a 2002 case concerning
the confidentiality of medical records sought by the state:
[W]omen seeking abortions in South Carolina have a great deal
more to fear than stigma. The protests designed to harass and
intimidate women from entering abortion clinics, and the

133
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-803 (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705
(2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5 (2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-740.2 (2009);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-7 (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241 (2009).
134

In re Jane Doe, 19 S.W.3d 346, 363 (Tex. 2000) (Enoch, J., concurring).

135
Id. at 363. Justice Enoch felt particularly stymied by Hecht’s practices, stating
that “[Hecht’s] disclosures leave the Court in an untenable position. The Court cannot
respond because to do so would require it to reveal whatever other pieces of the record
remain confidential.” Id.
136

N.W. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2004).
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violence inflicted on abortion providers, provide women with
ample reason to fear for their physical safety.137

Pro-life groups have videotaped abortion patients entering medical
clinics and posted their pictures on the web.138 Others have turned over the
names of minors entering clinics to law enforcement, arguing that the fact
of their pregnancy is prima facie evidence of statutory rape.139
Even if the townsfolk are not out with pitchforks (or mini-cams),
reputational consequences may attach from the revelation of pregnancy
alone. Gossip about that subject is always interesting and has long been a
basis of reputational injury.140 A minor is sometimes just as concerned
about her parents finding out she has had sex as she is about her parents
finding out that she is pregnant; pregnancy is the evidence that the girl is
not the trustworthy kind of daughter her parents thought she was.141 Once a
pregnancy is revealed, neighbors, friends, and church members will know
that she has had sex, that she was not smart or careful about it, and that no
boy has stepped forward to make things right.142
There are separate reputational implications for having or seeking
an abortion. There is some evidence of decreasing support for legal abortion
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Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Comm’r, S.C. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control,
317 F.3d 357, 377 (4th Cir. 2002).
138
Yochi Dreazan, In the Shadows: Photos of Women Who Get Abortions Go Up
on Internet, WALL ST. J. May 28, 2002, at A1 (reporting postings of women’s pictures on
Abortioncams.com and Christiangallery.com).
139
David Pasztor, Abortion Foes Involve Police in New Tactic, AUSTIN AM.
STATESMAN, Dec. 29, 2002, at A1.
140

See also Mary Beth Norton, Gender and Defamation in Seventeenth-Century
Maryland, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1987).
141
“They are here because they don’t want their parents to know that they are less
than perfect.” Catherine Candisky & Randall Edwards, Pregnant Jane Does Often
Intelligent, Scared, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 28, 1993, at 5B [hereinafter Candisky &
Edwards, Pregnant Jane Does] (quoting Juvenile Court Judge Katherine Liss).
142

Consider the fourteen-year-old pregnant minor, in foster care, who explained
that she wanted an abortion in part because “her continued pregnancy and delivery of a child
would affect her image with boys, who were bound to find out about it.” In re T.H., 484
N.E.2d 568, 569–70 (Ind. 1985). T.H. further explained that “she wished to continue her
education and make something of herself.” Id. The denial of her petition was upheld on
appeal. Id. at 571.
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among the young,143 and despite the fact that about one in three women in
the United States will have had an abortion during their reproductive
years,144 most are silent, if not secretive about it.145 Such reticence is
understandable: a powerful combination of forces—visual, political,
commercial—has made the fetus into a vivid, personable, and for some an
heroic presence.146 Anyone who has sat in traffic knows that “Abortion
Stops a Beating Heart” (bumper stickers) and the right thing to do is
“Choose Life” (license plates).147
These messages may work, and perhaps work too well. Some
young women find the revelation of an unwanted pregnancy so daunting
and the idea of an abortion so unthinkable that they hide their pregnancies
and abandon or kill their newborns. Acknowledging the phenomenon,
nearly every state has enacted an “infant safe havens” law authorizing
desperate young mothers to leave their newborns anonymously at
designated locations, such as emergency rooms and fire stations.148 Safe
143

See Elizabeth Hayt, Surprise, Mom: I’m Against Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
30, 2003, at sec. 9 p. 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/30/style/surprisemom-i-m-against-abortion.html (reporting that in 2002, fifty-four percent of college
freshmen favored legal abortion, compared to sixty-seven percent a decade earlier); Susan
Dominus, The Mysterious Disappearance of Young Pro-Choice Women, GLAMOUR, Aug.
2005, at 200–01 (reporting on the view that, because contraception is available, unwanted
pregnancy is just carelessness and abortion therefore inexcusable).
144
Guttmacher Inst., State Facts about Abortion: New York 2006,
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/sfaa/new_york.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2009) (concluding
that, based on current abortion rates, “about one in three American women will have had an
abortion by the time she reaches age 45.”).
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See Barbara Ehrenreich, Owning Up to Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2004, at
A21 (observing that while “abortion is legal—it’s just not supposed to be mentioned or
acknowledged as an acceptable option”). See also Alice Clapman, Note, Privacy Rights and
Abortion Outing: A Proposal for Using Common-Law Torts to Protect Abortion Patients and
Staff, 112 YALE L.J. 1545 (2003).
146

Sanger, Legislating in the Culture of Life, supra note 16, at 800–08, 821–28
(describing the religious and political development of the “culture of life” and the use of fetal
ultrasound imagery to establish the fetus as an immediate presence, respectively).
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Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and
Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 641–44 (2008) (discussing the legality of states’
issuances of controversially themed license places); Peggy Hau, The Politics of Law,
Language, & Morality: Thucydides & the Abortion Debate, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 711,
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haven laws are predicated on the incentive value of secrecy with regard to
the resolution of an unwanted pregnancy. In contrast to the immobilized
young women who are the targets of safe haven legislation, bypass
petitioners have faced up to their situations, thought through their options,
and have decided to take control of their lives within the bounds of the law.
Their privacy is no less important to them than it is to others law has so
elaborately sought to protect.
C. Humiliation, Dread, and the Demands of Dignity
As discussed earlier, my concern is less with the impact of bypass
hearings on a minor’s access to abortion (however serious that may be) than
with the harms wrought by virtue of participation in the process itself.
Although most petitions are approved in the end, it is still important to give
substantive content to what happens en route to the end. This section begins
the inquiry into what is required of minors at the hearings and how they
experience them, through the lens of dignitarian values.
Again, it is important to stress the distinctly legal character of the
bypass enterprise. The hearings are a form of legal process that take place in
a place of law and carry the formal indicia of law—there is a courtroom,
judge, testimony, counsel, and court reporter. Dignity has a special
resonance in this setting. Michelman has expressed these values, in the
context of a litigant’s access to a forum at all, as “reflecting concern for the
humiliation or loss of self-respect which a person might suffer if denied an
opportunity to litigate.”149 While minors are not exactly litigants, concerns
about self-respect apply equally in the context of petitioning.
In describing the workings of a trial, Robert Ferguson has observed
that “[e]very trial is about an unhappiness that someone has been unable to
stand, and every courtroom decision contains a mountain of misery for
someone.”150 A judicial bypass hearing may be less formal than a trial but it
is no less momentous. Ferguson’s phrase—a mountain of misery—captures
well its unhappy character.
1. Humiliation
Bypass hearings humiliate the girls who must participate in them.
This is not because most judges are mean or intentionally harsh, although
some certainly interrogate rather than question and lecture rather than
149

Michelman, supra note 27, at 1172.

150
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assess. But the problem lies in the nature of the inquiry and not simply its
manner. Bypass petitioners must testify before strangers regarding the most
private matters in a teenager’s life: the fact of sexual intercourse, the
predicament of pregnancy, and the structure or disarray of home life that
make petitioners believe they can not involve their parents. Girls are asked
about their views on motherhood, their personal relationships, and their
success (or struggles) in life so far. Such revelations are intensely difficult
for teenage girls, as they would be even for adults who, at least since the
pre-Roe days of hospital abortion review, have been spared the public
display of such private accounting.151
Certainly, in the area of criminal law, care is taken to protect rape
victims from having to testify unnecessarily about intimate issues. Under
the Federal Rules of Evidence, questions about the witness’s prior sexual
history or sexual disposition are forbidden in criminal and in civil
proceedings: “The rule aims to safeguard the alleged victim against the
invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is
associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion
of sexual innuendo into the fact-finding process.”152 In contrast, some
bypass judges feel quite free to pose all manner of personal comments and
questions to bypass petitioners. The state’s interest in respecting those who
come into court as victims should attach to those who come in as rights
bearers.
In thinking about how the hearings work on teenagers, it is
important to distinguish between embarrassment and humiliation. To reveal
or confide the facts of a pregnancy to a sister, friend, or counselor might
well be embarrassing. The sex, the pregnancy, or the relationship may have
been a big mistake; one should have known better, been more careful or less
trusting. But these same confidences register quite differently when their
revelation is not a matter of private confession or counsel, but is instead
compelled in court. These are the very subjects—sex, secrecy, mistakes—
that make talk so very interesting when it takes the form of gossip and is
about someone else.153
151

See generally Rickie Solinger, “A Complete Disaster”: Abortion and the
Politics of Hospital Abortion Committees, 1950-1970, 19 FEMINIST STUD. 241 (1993)
[hereinafter Solinger, A Complete Disaster] (describing the use of hospital abortion boards
composed of obstetricians and psychiatrists to decide if an abortion was necessary “to
preserve the life” of pregnant women seeking a legal abortion.).
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Bypass testimony requires something like gossiping about oneself.
That only the judge and a few others—bailiff, court reporter, attorney—are
present does little to diminish the magnitude of the intrusion. Anonymity
and confidentiality provisions may protect bypass petitioners from the
wider public view, but that is not the only sense in which something may be
made public. A judge, even in a closed courtroom, represents the state.
Bypass hearings require girls to reveal personal matters before a powerful
public official. For minors, this is not a private hearing but a recitation in
front of an important authoritative adult.
Moreover, humiliation does not necessarily dependent on the
presence of an audience. Consider a corporal punishment case from the
European Court of Human Rights, in which the Court had to decide whether
the “birching” (three strokes with a cane) of a fifteen-year-old boy by the
local constable was degrading treatment under Article 3 of the Convention
on Human Rights, which protects “a person’s dignity and physical
integrity.”154 The local authorities from the Isle of Man had argued that the
birching was not degrading, in part because it took place in private and
because the boy’s name was not published. In rejecting their argument, the
Court observed:
“Publicity may be a relevant factor in assessing whether a
punishment is ‘degrading’ . . . but the Court does not consider
that absence of publicity will necessarily prevent a given
punishment from falling into that category: it may well suffice
that the victim is humiliated in his own eyes, even if not in the
eyes of others.”155

Similarly, concern about the degrading treatment of detainees in
Iraq and elsewhere has not depended on it being viewed by others. In some
cases the debasement was displayed to others; in other cases it was not.
Humiliation works because of how the treatment registers with the
subjected person. Whatever the reasons may be for using humiliation in the
interrogation setting, there is no proper account for its use on young women
during a civil hearing.

154

See Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 EUR. CT. H.R. (ser A) ¶¶ 32–33 (1978). As
the Court explained, “[t]he applicant was made to take down his trousers and underpants and
bend over a table; he was held by two policemen whilst a third administered the punishment,
pieces of the birch breaking at the first stroke. . . . The birching raised, but did not cut, the
applicant’s skin and he was sore for about a week and a half afterwards.” Id. ¶ 10.
155

Id. ¶ 32 (emphasis added).
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2. Terror and Testimony
Courtrooms and courthouses are often intimidating settings, even
for adults and even for litigants not testifying about unwanted pregnancy.
Testimony by judges who hear bypass cases, by advocates who accompany
petitioners, and by minors themselves make absolutely clear that the
experience is one of anxiety and dread. A Minnesota judge described the
level of apprehension of petitioners as worse than that of women seeking
orders of protection for domestic violence.156 A study of twenty-six
Massachusetts minors whose petitions were all granted revealed a near
universal fear that they would say something wrong and their petitions
would be denied; this in a state where nearly all petitions are successful.157
Lawyers who represent minors are aware of their distress and are hesitant to
leave them alone in courthouse hallways.158
Even before the law steps in, these young women are unmarried,
pregnant, and facing a profound set of decisions about the course their lives
will take. In some respects, they are not unlike pregnant women: both
groups must consider and weigh existing obligations and aspirations against
those of motherhood. Of course, adult women who decide to end a
pregnancy do not have to deliberate about the reasons for their decision out
loud in court. They do not have testify about the circumstances of
intercourse, their mishaps with contraception, misgivings about pregnancy,
or the nature of their relationships with those closest to them.
These are exactly the areas of inquiry pursued by courts in their
attempts to assess the maturity of bypass petitioners. In response to
questions from judges or from their own attorneys, young women have had
to explain that they were impregnated by their own fathers,159 had a prior
abortion,160 had intercourse with more than one man,161 and experienced
156

Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 766 (D. Minn. 1986), rev’d, 853 F.2d
1452 (8th Cir. 1988).
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J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Grounded in the Reality of Their Lives: Listening to
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WOMEN’S L.J. 61 (2003).
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In re Anonymous, 678 So. 2d 783, 784 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (Fourteen-yearold petitioner testified that “her pregnancy resulted from sexual abuse practiced upon her by
her father.”).
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See In re Jane Doe 1, 566 N.E.2d 1181, 1181 (Ohio 1990) (petition denied).

161

Id.

448

Columbia Journal of Gender and Law

[Vol. 18:2

family violence (against them or against their mothers).162 Girls have
testified about depression and self-cutting following the death of a mother
(displaying the scars to the court),163 broken condoms,164 discord between
parents, and parental opposition to the prospect of an interracial child.165
The concern here is not whether these facts were accepted as
grounds for maturity but rather that they had to be given at all. As the
appellate record reveals, invasive lines of inquiry are accepted as valid
routes to assessing maturity and best interests. Questions about home life,
religious values, or attitudes about adoption may not be asked in every case,
but, when they are, the resulting testimony is often disturbing. A
grandmother pleads with the court to approve the petition on account of her
granddaughter’s depression.166 As an experienced Texas bypass attorney
explained:
These cases are hard on everyone. . . . You must ask a 17-year
old why her family is dysfunctional. Odds are her boyfriend
dumped her when he found out she was pregnant, and she is
having the biggest crisis of her life. Now she has to go to court
and tell a bunch of strangers about it. It’s heartbreaking stuff.167

Judges are sometimes disdainful and harsh. A thirteen-year-old is
mocked for having no job other than “detasseling corn.”168 More recently, a
judge turned down a petition stating: “[T]he legislature, in its infinite
wisdom, has determined that an unborn child who never has had even the

162
See In re Doe 3, 645 N.E.2d 134, 134–35 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (denial reversed
on appeal); In re Anonymous, 711 So.2d 475, 475 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998).
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In re A.W., 826 So.2d 1280, 1282 (Miss. 2002).
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In re Jane Doe, No. 02CA0067, 2002 WL 31492302, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept.
16, 2002); In re Doe, 973 So.2d 548, 550 (Fla. Ct. App. 2008) (minor testified she was
“doing everything . . . under the circumstances to try and prevent this from happening”).
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In re Jane Doe, 2002 WL 31492302, at *2.
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Mark Donald, Dissent over Consent, TEX. LAW., Mar. 7, 2005,
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ability to do any wrong, could be put to death so that his mother can play
[sports].”169
We should not lose sight of the consequences of judicial
disapproval on minors. Girls whose petitions are denied understand that
they have not been believed, despite their sworn testimony, and the
appellate cases reveal a pervasive dismissiveness of minors’ reasons for not
telling their parents. Minors’ concerns about being beaten170 or thrown out
of the house (as was the petitioner’s older sister when she got pregnant)171
or about parental well–being (a depressed mother172 or a violent stepfather
who threatened the mother)173 are discounted as mere excuses for not
wanting to be in trouble. Of course minors do not want to get in trouble, and
some may overestimate the severity of parental reaction. On the other hand,
minors are likely to have it exactly right. They may uniquely understand the
demands of their family’s interests (parents, stepparents, siblings) and their
role in family caretaking and be able to gauge the emotional fall-out of an
abortion on their families. Moreover, other facts can be arrayed against the
judicial hypothesis that minors are exaggerating certain fears—for example,
the potential for domestic violence among adult women required to notify
their husbands about an abortion.174 The same dynamic would seem to
apply with even greater force in the case of minors obliged to notify
parents.
Having one’s petition denied means that the minor has been
officially declared incapable of assessing her own circumstances and needs
in a court of law. The impact of this should not be underestimated. Robert
Ferguson has noted that judges—or the “judicial figure”—enjoy

169
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Anonymous, 718 So.2d 64 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998).
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In re Anonymous, 515 So.2d 1254, 1255 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987) (citing the
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unprecedented authority in a democracy: “[We] set judges apart.”175 To be
judged in court is a profound moment and hits hard, though on occasion, a
ruling may exalt; one Texas attorney emphasizes to her clients in successful
bypass cases that being designated a mature person in a court of law is
something one can be very proud of.176
3. Dignity
Is it fair or appropriate to require that a minor undergo an ordeal by
process as the price of deciding to end a pregnancy? Put another way, are
there limits to what a pregnant girl should have to do as part of exercising
her rights under Roe? Some may insist that the intimate information
squeezed out of minors is necessary to evaluate their maturity, or that it
isn’t really all that humiliating. No doubt teenagers experience some things
as humiliating which may not be so from an objective point of view:
consider the mere presence (or existence) of parents.
But the situations we are considering are surely humiliating for
young girls if anything is. Bypass hearings concern matters that are not only
private but perhaps disturbing, involving secrets about their bodies, their
relationships, their religious beliefs, and how all of these map on to
aspirations, whether imagined or concrete, for the future. A Florida judge
denied a petition in part because, when asked if her decision had been
difficult, the minor simply answered “yes.”177 The appellate court affirmed,
noting that “[t]he record before the trial judge fails . . . to advise the trial
court of the depth or duration of her deliberative process.”178 But
deliberation is exactly the aspect of abortion decision-making that ought to
be protected. The decision encompasses a range of deeply personal, often
self-defining preferences and commitments and these should not be on
inspection.
Some might argue that while dignity is the proper measure for the
treatment of adults before the law, its application is less necessary when
applied to minors. They are, after all, still unformed and still subject to the
control and discipline of others. They are not quite ready but only “destined
for dignity.” Perhaps a little discipline in the form of a bypass hearing might
175
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have a useful educational function. Certainly parents may chide, punish,
and even humiliate their children almost as they see fit.
But judges stand in a different relation to children than do parents.
Judges are representatives of the state, and minors are not the subjects of
their parental custody. Some judges, however well intentioned, seem to
have gotten confused on the point. As a Florida trial court judge stated to
one young woman after denying her petition:
Miss, I know this seems like the most terrible thing in the world.
And, I will tell you, as I indicated, a father of two daughters, and
I want you to know that I am Catholic. And, I have always told
my daughters, whatever it is, you can discuss it with me. And at a
certain point, I will also tell you, that I have always told them,
regardless of what I might think, if something happened to you,
that would be your decision and whatever decision you make, I
will support you.
I’m not telling you that you can or cannot terminate that
pregnancy. I just think, in your best interest, where you are going
to have to go through with it with your parents, it would be best
for you to notify your parents. And, I am sure they love you.179

Another judge stated: “Let me just say, I’m very concerned about
this young lady’s welfare. Like counsel, I’m a mother.”180 This confusion of
roles is particularly problematic in a hearing that is an express alternative to
parental involvement. Bypass petitioners are citizens as well as children,
however incomplete their citizenship may be.
The law has rejected subjecting children to forms of humiliation on
constitutional grounds in other circumstances. In Safford Unified School
District v. Redding, the Supreme Court considered the search of an eighth
grader by school officials who had been looking for over-the-counter
painkillers.181 Informed by another student that 13 year old Savana Redding
had the contraband in her notebook, the vice-principal searched the
notebook. When no pills were found, he directed the school nurse and a
179
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woman assistant to have Redding “remove her clothes down to her
underwear, and then ‘pull out’ her bra and the elastic band on her
underpants.”182 Redding challenged the search as unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. In its decision, the Court found that the school officials
had immunity, but it agreed with Redding about the search itself. Because
there had been no reason to suspect that the pills were in Redding’s
undergarments (as opposed to in her notebook), a search that “necessarily
exposed her breasts and pelvic area to some degree” was impermissible. 183
In finding the examination of Redding’s body had been
“excessively intrusive,” the Court applied the established school-search
standard requiring officials to take account of “the age and sex of the
student and the nature of the infraction.”184 It concluded this thirteen year
old girl’s “subjective expectation of privacy against such a search was
inherent in her account of it as embarrassing, frightening, and
humiliating.”185 The Court contextualized the nature as well as the
mechanics of the search. Unlike getting undressed for a gym class,
“exposing for a search is responding to an accusation reserved for suspected
wrongdoers and fairly understood as so degrading that a number of
communities . . . have banned [strip searches in schools] no matter what the
facts may be.”186
Bypass petitioners are not subject to body searches but instead to
questions about their bodies. What they are asked to talk about—an actual
pregnancy, sexual relations, the details of the abortion procedure—is not a
physical examination, but in some ways it comes close. While many bypass
petitioners are sixteen and seventeen, some, like Redding, are only thirteen;
responding to such questions might reasonably and subjectively be
experienced as humiliating at any age. Like the search of Redding’s
underpants, bypass questioning takes place in an official formal site—a
courtroom instead of the principal’s office—and similarly is conducted by
formidable adults. Despite the absence of a legal infraction, the aura of
accusation hangs over bypass hearings.
Of course, what is missing in the bypass context is a search as
defined for Fourth Amendment purposes. Nonetheless, the Redding case is
182
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helpful in thinking about what constitutes the respectful treatment of young
people required to interact with the state even in a civil setting. As the
Supreme Court concluded in Redding, “[t]he meaning of such a search, and
the degradation its subject may reasonably feel, place a search that intrusive
in a category of its own demanding its own specific suspicions.”187 As a
distinct form of legal hearing, bypass hearings are also in a category of their
own. What other forum requires the revelation of such intimate deliberation
as a prerequisite for exercising a constitutional right?
Consider also the school cases in which minors have resisted
saluting or praying in school on First Amendment grounds. In response to
such complaints, school boards offered an opt-out provision: students who
did not wish to pray or salute could leave the room, or otherwise
demonstrably decline to participate. Yet the Supreme Court rejected this
response in part because of the subjective costs to the students of opting out.
As the Court stated in Lee v. Weisman, in which students could decline to
participate in prayer during their high school graduation ceremony,
[t]he undeniable fact is that the school district’s supervision and
control of a high school graduation ceremony places public
pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand
as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the
invocation and benediction. This pressure, though subtle and
indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.188

Weighing the experiential costs to students, the Court found that opt-out
provisions were themselves a source of coercion.
The analogy here is a modest one; I simply note another context in
which the law has paid attention to the dignitary interests of minors by
taking seriously the concrete circumstances under which they are permitted
to exercise their rights. The Court in Lee acknowledged that “[r]esearch in
psychology supports the common assumption that adolescents are often
susceptible to pressure from their peers towards conformity, and that the
influence is strongest in matters of social convention.”189 While bypass
hearings do not involve peer pressure, they do involve circumstantial
pressure: the solemnity and unfamiliarity of the courthouse, court
personnel, and language of law. Minors who have undergone bypass
187
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hearings have found the hearings to be the most difficult and intimidating
part of the entire abortion experience.190 Whether, in Casey’s terms, this is a
“purpose” or simply an “effect,” it is unquestionably a consequence, and
one that implicates dignitarian interests.
4. The Indignity of Exclusion
Minors’ dignity is implicated by still another aspect of the bypass
process. This is the practice of some judges not to hear—let alone rule on—
bypass petitions at all. Some judges formally recuse themselves;191 others
simply have their clerks turn back petitions (“We don’t do that in this
county”).192 In one urban jurisdiction, only three judges out of pool of sixty
hear bypass cases;193 in another, lawyers have experienced “up to five
recusals [from a single case] before it lands on someone who will take it.”194
In such cases, minors and their advocates may wait for another judge to take
the calendar on another day, or they may travel to another county to file the
petition and be heard.195
The practice has been effective; counties where judges shun cases
record few if any bypass petitions. Because pregnant young women have
little time to waste, they tend to file in counties where they have a chance to
be heard, and where there also may be a medical clinic in case they prevail.
In Ohio, for example, girls from all around the state tend to file in
Cleveland, Akron, or Youngstown.196 They do not file in Geauga County,
where over a two year period no bypass cases were filed. When asked why
no petitions had been filed in Geauga Country for two years, the education
190
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chairman of the Geauga County Right to Life answered that “[m]aybe it’s
because it’s more of a Christian place. We don’t have any abortionaries
here. We don’t have any killing centers. And a lot of girls who are going to
kill their babies don’t want anyone to see them.”197 But although refusing to
hear cases may deter teen petitions, it does not wholly prevent teen
abortions. Public health records reveal that eighteen minors from Geauga
County had abortions over the same two year period.198 The cost of
obtaining the abortion has simply been made dearer.
This informal system of forum deprivation is deeply problematic,
and I discuss its impact on law’s legitimacy below. Here, however, I want
simply to expose its dignitarian consequences, as young women scramble to
find a court where they can be heard. Most women, even young ones, have
a pretty good sense of abortion’s disfavored status under the law. They may
not have the vocabulary of “hyperregulation” but they know there is
something suspect about a medical procedure treated so differently from all
others. Denying young women a legal forum takes things up a notch. Forum
exclusion tells them that their claim falls below the requirements of justice
and that the problem of how to gain access to the courts is theirs alone to
solve. This is more than an inconvenience. It is an affront to the status and
self-worth that participation in legal process bestows and it should be
recognized as such.
Tucked into dignitarian concerns are two other closely related
concerns: participation and effectuation values. Identified by Frank
Michelman in the context of due process decisions regarding litigation
access,199 each of these implicates the dignity of bypass petitioners.
Participation values reflect “an appreciation of litigation as one of the
modes in which persons exert influence, or have their wills ‘counted,’ in
societal decisions they care about.”200 The expressed will of bypass
petitioners can only be counted through the operation of the hearing offered
as a constitutional substitute for the decisional authority established in Roe.
In the bypass context, participation lies cheek by jowl with what Michelman
has called the effectuation value, which “see[s] litigation as an important
means through which persons are entitled to get, or are given assurance of
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Michelman, supra note 27, at 1172–73.
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having, whatever we are pleased to regard as rightfully theirs.”201 Bypass
hearings are not only an important means, they are the only legal means by
which a pregnant minor can proceed, at least in thirty four states. Perhaps
the problem is that “we,” or at least a good number of us, are not pleased to
regard an abortion decision as rightfully theirs. On this account, denying
minors the chance to effectuate their decision may, at a practical level, seem
more like local justice than an indignity.
IV. COMPELLING NARRATIVE
What is the significance of using a judicial hearing as the means of
supervising teenage abortion? To explore the question, this Part looks at
other hearings in which the content and tone of a petitioner’s plea is crucial
to the outcome. One distant but intriguing example of what I have in mind
is found in Natalie Zemon Davis’s study of sixteenth-century French letters
of remission, or “pardon tales.”202 It is helpful at times to stand back from
the preoccupation with particular concerns and look at other forums of
supplication: their operation, their structures, and the uses to which they
were put. I look as well at a few examples closer to home and suggest
parallels between bypass hearings and modern American parole hearings
and defendant allocutions. As with other analogies, my aim is to illustrate
and to help articulate misgivings which we feel almost instinctively about
the bypass process.
In looking at hearings across continents and centuries, I consider
hearings as a genre or type of legal proceeding and so draw on insights from
genre theory. As Alistair Fowler has explained, genres operate by means of
“shared but more or less unconscious and unformulated grammatical
rules.”203 “Every genre has a unique repertoire, from which its
representatives select characteristics”; some are matters of form and some
are substantive.204 In literary genres such as the novel, these include such
features as length, setting, character types, character names, and so on.
Similar features, some matters of form or procedure and some substantive,
also cast light on how the bypass hearing, as a type of legal process,
conveys meaning both to its participants and to a wider social audience.
201
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Thinking about hearings as a genre is something of a challenge in
that the concept of a hearing includes such a wide range of legal events. In
general, a “hearing” is a non-technical term used to describe an occasion
when a person presents argument or evidence before an official legal officer
in a situation short of a trial.205 Even this general description produces a set
of characteristics, such as a degree of informality, as a feature of the
process. Hearings also involve some form of request or plea made before
and resolved by a legal authority. It is important to keep these general
features—informality, plea, decision-maker, resolution—in mind as they
combine with the distinctive aspects of bypass hearings. These include the
petitioner’s anonymity, her minority, the origins of her plea in a right, and
the highly politicized nature of the hearing’s content—a decision about
abortion.
A. Pardon Tales
Because much about the structure and purposes of French pardon
tales parallels aspects of modern bypass hearings, I discuss the tales in some
detail. Pardon tales or letters of remission were pleas by wrongdoers,
mostly men, who had committed capital offenses and wished to ask for the
king’s mercy.206 The requests took the form of letters written to the king in
which the supplicants sought to explain what had happened and why they
should be forgiven. Written in the third person, the letters attempted “to
make sense of the unexpected and build coherence” by showing that their
wrongful behavior had resulted from unusual circumstances and was

205

I thank Robert Ferguson for this discussion.
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DAVIS, supra note 202, at 7–8. The process required several steps, each of
which involved a presentation of the supplicant’s story. The supplicant had to get permission
from a chancellery officer even to have a royal notary write up the story, sometimes with the
help of an attorney. The letter was then read aloud before a chancellor, where it was
discussed and examined. Only then, and only if the act was remissible and the excuses
acceptable, would the letter receive the royal seal. The supplicant then took the sealed letter
to a royal court for ratification. At this stage, which could last several months, the judges
interrogated the supplicant, witnesses, and relatives of the deceased to corroborate the story
told in the letter and to vouch for the supplicant’s past “good life and conversation.” There
were risks in seeking pardon. If the letter was dismissed, the offender would have to stand
trial, already having admitted to committing the act. Nonetheless, the remission process had
serious advantages: no testimony by the offender under torture and the supplicant’s own
story “set the frame for all the questioning and comparing of testimony that followed.” Id. at
8–14.
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therefore both understandable and uncharacteristic.207 For example, letters
would often locate the killing within festive days, when the excitement of
wine and dancing and resulting jealousies and quarrels might explain the
how the crime came about.208 Letters succeeded through the supplicant’s
ability to present a persuasive tale about why he should be pardoned. As
Davis notes, they showed “narrative skills at work in realistic and selfinterested persuasion.”209
How did the ordinary wrong-doer bring this about? Pardon tales
came not only from knights and gentlemen, but also from “the lips of lower
orders.”210 How were regular folk able to craft a sufficiently persuasive
tale? The answer is in part that the letters were collaborations between
supplicants, royal notaries, and on occasion, lawyers. After hearing the
supplicant’s story, the notaries would write up a draft, often embellishing it
in order to present the supplicant as more sympathetic or more wellconnected.211 For those who could afford it, lawyers would then fine-tune
the letter to make sure that the story met the demands of lawful excuse; for
example, by clarifying that the murder weapon had not been specially
procured for the act.212
Yet despite this collaborative construction, the primary voice in the
pardon tale was the supplicant’s, and for two quite sensible reasons. The
first concerned the very nature of royal pardon seeking: the letter was
understood as “a personal exchange, a subject’s voice speaking to the king

207

Id. at 4. Successful letters “recreated for readers and for hearers a situation
where the supplicant became all of a sudden justifiably or understandably heated up and may
have feared for his or her life.” Id. at 37.
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Certain narrative conventions were common in what Davis identifies as the
“anger plots” of the letters; “[e]xchanged, demanded, stolen, and especially knocked off, hats
triggered trouble in remission stories.” Id. at 38. Women’s tales, in contrast, often focused on
problems around meal preparation. Id.
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Id. at 111.
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A notary might “fatten the preamble” by describing the supplicant as a “poor
simple miller,” or a “poor disabled widow.” Id. at 16. Notaries would aver that “in all other
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having been reproved, attainted, or convicted of any other vile action . . . or done anything
worthy of blame.” Id.
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and the merciful king responding.”213 Second were the realities of truth
telling. A story that was faithful to the supplicant’s own speech and
memory was more likely to stand if later challenged by witnesses. Thus,
although the letters may have resulted from “an exchange among several
people about events, points of law, and chancellery style,”214 Davis
concludes that they “can still be analyzed in terms of the life and values of
the person seeking to save his neck by a story.”215
Supplicants were up to the task because even “the unlearned among
them did not come to their request for pardon innocent of storytelling
skills.”216 Indeed, Davis observes that information about successful pardon
seeking was widely available, “as necessary to villagers as information
about dowry customs was to any wife.”217 Supplicants often showed up at
the notary’s office “with a story in mind and, in the case of a literate person,
perhaps with a draft.”218 They understood the “literary strategies” of a good
pardon tale—what had to be said and how.219 Thus the avenged grievance
must have been unexpected, the supplicant’s anger appropriate to his
station, and his regret obvious.220 Details were concrete, sometimes chatty,
so that the tale became a snapshot of an ordinary life gone suddenly awry.
213

Id. at 20. At the court hearing one would literally beg for the king’s grace by
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hands.” Id. at 11.
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were not able to be ordained, they were never eligible to have the “benefit of clergy.” John
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B. Bypass Hearings and the Constraints of Genre
As stylized forms of a plea, pardon tales and bypass procedures
have much in common. From a structural point of view, the letters are, as
Davis notes, a “mixed genre: a judicial supplication to persuade the king
and courts, a historical account of one’s past actions, and a story.”221 Bypass
narratives similarly seek to persuade by accounting for past actions. Minors
must organize the circumstances of their predicament and their desire to
abort into a compelling, convincing narrative. Because the hearings are a
live colloquy between petitioner, lawyer, and judge, the minor’s
presentation is likely to be less polished than the written pardon tale. This
immediacy puts increased pressure on the hearing and on whatever limited
preparation between a petitioner and her attorney precedes it.222
Nonetheless, the task of both the pardon tale and the bypass testimony is
similar: to establish a picture of someone worthy of the court’s favor, an
ordinary person seeking extraordinary relief on the strength of the
presentation.
To do this in the bypass context, the petitioner must situate herself
as having acted out of character in the events leading up to the hearing. This
is part of the vocabulary of the genre. The sixteenth century supplicant
could invoke a standard set of conventions—the passions of festival time
and so on—to explain why he had acted hotheadedly. In some respects, the
modern minor has a more difficult challenge: she must explain how a girl
who stands before the court pregnant and unmarried is mature enough to
decide about abortion, an act that for some judges is worse than what she
has already done. The best she can do is to rely on a set of familiar teenage
conventions to prove her upstanding character: the part-time job, good
grades, activities in school, plans for college. Note that the minor must also
argue in a delicate alternative: first that she is mature enough to make the
decision, but in case that fails, that she is too hapless to take on the
responsibilities of motherhood and it is therefore in her best interest to have
an abortion.223
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A lawyer from a well staffed jurisdiction described the process: “We have
enough pro bono attorneys ready to drop everything so that the clerk’s office can find one of
us to get down there, spend fifteen minutes with the client to prepare for the hearings, get to
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Her performative task is made the harder, however, by two distinct
aspects of the hearings. The first concerns the relation between the manner
in which petitioners testify and the court’s assessment of their maturity. The
second concerns the problematic position of the minor. From the very start
of the bypass process, certain structural features make her appear an
unreliable witness, an unreliable girl.
1. Manner and Maturity
In deciding whether or not a minor is mature, trial judges are
entitled to “draw inferences from the minor’s composure, analytic ability,
appearance, thoughtfulness, tone of voice, expressions, and her ability to
articulate her reasoning and conclusions.”224 Yet a lack of composure
should not be surprising in the bypass context. As a Minnesota judge
observed, “[y]ou see all the typical things that you would see with
somebody under incredible amounts of stress, answering monosyllabically,
tone of voice, tenor of voice, shaky, wringing of hands, you know, one
young lady had her—her hands were turning blue and it was warm in my
office.”225
Stammering and other inadequacies of speech such as slang or
blurting have counted against petitioners and been accepted as proof of
immaturity. For example, when asked if she understood the risks involved
in abortion, a thirteen-year-old petitioner answered, “Well, I hear you have
bad cramps or you may get something up inside you that could cause risks”;
when asked about childbirth, she replied that she “wouldn’t be able to go
through with that.”226 The court concluded that the minor was “unable to
communicate . . . a sufficient understanding of the medical procedure
involved, the associated risks, or of the alternatives to abortion.”227 Yet even
petitions from highly articulate minors have been denied. An Alabama
minor answered similar questions about risks by stating:
You could have an infection if you don’t take care of yourself
afterwards. Sterilization if the instruments they use are not
properly cleaned. You could have bleeding because you bleed
224
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after you’ve had the abortion. You could have—what was the
other one they told me—death, the main one, I guess. But they
said that’s always a factor.228

She too was found to be immature and insufficiently informed because she
had not spoken personally to the physician who was to perform the
abortion.229
The fact is that bypass petitioners are teenagers and many of them
talk like teenagers. In presenting her reasons for seeking an abortion, a
Texas petitioner explained:
[I]f I really put my cards on the table and look through them, I—I
having a baby right now would probably stop 75 percent of what
I want to do . . . . I know—I’m—like I said, I’m very busy. I have
a lot of high goals, and having a baby would stop me from having
them.230

Of course “pretty busy” isn’t the best way to express why you would rather
finish your education than have a baby and perhaps stammering sounds
tentative. On another reading, however, the testimony seems honest and
natural. Nonetheless, the Texas Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s
ruling that “a minor who was reluctant to carry her child to term because, at
least in part, she was ‘pretty busy’ was not mature enough to make the
[abortion] decision without parental guidance.”231
In some instances the minor’s discomfort and its consequences for
the quality of her testimony is intensified by the conduct of the judge
himself. In a recent Florida case, the judge told the petitioner before
denying the petition that:
You know your mother and father, especially your mother, are
going to know that you are pregnant. And if she sees you, she
will know. Major things happen to your body when you get
pregnant, even if you have an abortion.232
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Although the denial was upheld on appeal, a dissenting judge
observed that “the [trial] judge’s improper and openly argumentative
personal assertions likely would have intimidated most adults—indeed,
most attorneys. It is not difficult to imagine the chilling effect that his
behavior had on this young woman’s ability to elaborate on her
situation.”233
There has also been a contrary complaint about the manner of
minors’ testimony. This is not that the testimony is too casual but that it is
too rehearsed. In an Alabama case, the petition was denied in part because
the minor’s answers “appeared to be [given] in an almost rehearsed manner
. . . [without] any expression of emotion.”234 Upheld on appeal, a dissenting
justice stated that “I cannot believe that the fact that the testimony of a party
has been rehearsed indicates that the testimony is a lie . . . . Preparing a
party for trial is not suborning perjury.”235 But there are all sorts of ways to
call a girl out. An Ohio minor testified that she was both planning to start
using birth control and that she was not going to have sex again; her petition
was denied in part on grounds of internal inconsistency.236 Well, maybe, but
it is not so hard to see how such contradictions come about when aspiration,
reality, and the flustered desire to give the right answer come together in
court.
2. The Structure of Stealth
A minor’s presentation of herself as a worthy object of the judicial
favor is further complicated, if not compromised, by the very nature of the
bypass process. The very name of a bypass hearing suggests an end run
around something, and explains why some advocates prefer to call the
hearings “waivers.”237 There is also an uneasy fit between the procedural
233
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requirement of anonymity and the appearance of furtiveness produced by
aspects of the requirement that cuts against the task at hand. Consider the
many ways in which she appears untrustworthy and sneaky. By virtue of
her petition, the court knows she has had sex and is a girl “in trouble.” She
has literally snuck into court in order not to be seen, and she uses an alias or
initials in order not to be known.238 In the eyes of many, she is sneaking
around the traditional laws of parental control; in the eyes of others, by
seeking an abortion, she is trying to sneak around the very wages of sin.239
To the extent the sixteenth century pardon-seeker could show that his
wrongful conduct was a one-off, the bypass petitioner’s dissolute ways
seem on-going.
Although these aspects of the hearing may cast bypass petitioners
as “bad girls,” there is some irony here, for these are not the kids who
typically turn up in court for misconduct. These are girls who have planned
futures for themselves and believe that motherhood, at this stage of their
lives, will take them off course. As one Ohio judge commented, “[t]he
common denominator is that they are intelligent and have a lot on the
ball.”240 But for their pregnancies and their desire to abort, these are the
“good girls.”
3. Gender and Narrative Demand
The concept of “good girls” raises an important distinction between
bypass hearings and pardon tales: the role of gender in making one’s case.
As Davis points out, few pardon seekers in sixteenth century France were
women, their absence explained in part by the narrative demands of the
plea.241 Women who killed were “removed by cultural assumptions . . .
238

Fowler explains that there was a tradition against publishing the names of the
gentry; the device of initials was therefore introduced to create the hint of scandal in high
life.” FOWLER, supra note 203, at 86. Consider Jane Austen’s suppression in Pride and
Prejudice of the name of the “——— shire militia” to which the scandalous Wickham
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AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE 212, 274 (Scribner 1918)).
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from the acceptable legal excuses of impulse.”242 They were less able to
depend on “ritual or festive settings to give workable coherence to their
remission narratives” and generally had a much smaller range of
explanatory settings that might have caused and could excuse their anger.243
Crucial narrative elements of a successful pardon tale—cavorting in public,
the unexpected insult, sudden anger, and subsequent remorse—were not
available to them. Only killing to protect one’s sexual honor was an
acceptable ground for seeking mercy, and in such cases women situated
their stories within familiar household scenes, such as preparing meals.244
Moreover, as Davis explains, because subjection was an everyday feature of
women’s lives, “being on their knees in humble supplication” was a less
impressive gesture than when displayed by a man.245
The absence of women pardon seekers was also a function of
substantive law. The capital crimes most associated with women, witchcraft
and infanticide, were simply not pardonable.246 By the sixteenth century, the
death of an unbaptized infant following a concealed pregnancy was
evidence of sexual sin punishable by death.247 Both family morality and
royal majesty were better served by giving such a woman the justice she
deserved; some acts were “too wicked for king’s pardon.”248
Of course, in contrast to French pardon seekers, all bypass
petitioners are women. Yet the same problems that vexed women
supplicants centuries ago are at work in the present setting: how to position
oneself as worthy of judicial sympathy when the underlying act was sexual,
secret, and sometimes consensual? How to make the error of one’s ways
aberrational when the hearing itself underscores ongoing stealth? And
242
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finally, how to overcome the view in the eyes of some judges that despite
its legality, abortion and infanticide are one and the same and that each is
too wicked for the king’s pardon?
C. The Expression of Remorse
Although bypass hearings are organized around the court’s
determination about maturity, conveying a sense of remorse has in some
instances become entwined in the process. Remorse has been understood as
an aspect of rehabilitation and that, in turn, is a sign of maturity. The person
is on the right path because the old one has been renounced. Depending on
the judge, the successful petitioner’s story will therefore include not only
reports about grade point average and after-school jobs but also a
satisfactory explanation as to why, despite rejecting her parents, adoption,
and, by some lights, her fetus, the minor deserves to have her petition
granted. This requires an appropriate shading of the tale, one that not only
establishes maturity but gestures toward contrition for the mess she has
gotten herself into and from which she now asks the court’s help to escape.
This packaging of the story—in a sense this packaging of the self—
creates harm of a quality that law has a unique power to bring about. The
bypass petitioner swears to tell the truth but she also understands that
something more (or less) is required. Like a defendant before a sentencing
judge or an inmate before a parole board, she must present a version of
herself that matches a set of expectations about what a remorseful
defendant, a reformed parolee, or a contrite pregnant teenager looks like. In
the case of sentencing or parole, guilt will have been established by the
verdict, yet it has been crucial to the plea for a lesser sentence or early
release that the defendants accept responsibility for their actions
themselves.249 As a popular jailhouse manual tells parolees, “[board]
members will consider why the crime happened, whether you feel any
remorse for the crime, and what you would do differently in the future.”250
This is accomplished both by reciting the words and displaying the
249
See Lisa F. Orenstein, Sentencing Leniency May Be Denied to Criminal
Offenders Who Fail to Express Remorse at Allocution, 56 MD. L. REV. 780, 780 (1997).
250

See generally COLUMBIA HUM. RTS. L. REV., JAILHOUSE LAWYER’S MANUAL
937 (8th ed. 2009). The statutory condition for parole is “a reasonable probability that, if
such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that
his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the
seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.” N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 9, § 8002.1(a) (2009).
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appearance of a remorseful person.251 Allocution before sentencing works
much the same way. The Third Circuit has described it as:
[T]he opportunity [for the court] to evaluate the total person who
stands at the bar of justice: to note the physical appearance and
demeanor; the tone, temper and rhythm of speech; the facial
expressions, the hands, the revealing look into the eyes. In sum,
[the absence of allocution] deprives the judge of those
impressions gleaned through the senses in any personal
confrontation in which one attempts to assess the credibility or to
evaluate the true moral fiber of another.252

There are several problems with requiring remorse as a condition to
leniency in the criminal context. There is concern that this may violate a
defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.253 There is also the
problem of defendants who, despite conviction, are innocent and therefore
have nothing to repent. (This was the case with the four young men
convicted in the “Central Park jogger” case.)254 Moreover, even a
remorseful defendant or parolee may be bad at performing remorse and is
therefore demonstrably unconvincing. This may be a particular problem
with juvenile defendants, who for developmental and social reasons may
fail to display sufficient remorse and who have in consequence been
removed from juvenile court to stand trial as an adult.255
My concern is less a bypass petitioner’s inability to show remorse
or contrition than whether the display should be required in the first place.
251
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Bypass hearings are supposed to be about a minor’s maturity, not her
attitude. Yet advocates who represent minors are often aware that some
judges want to hear some indication that she is sorry (whether for the
pregnancy or the abortion isn’t always clear), that this situation won’t
happen again (and some proof to back it up), and that she considers abortion
to have moral implications that she has taken seriously.256 Because the very
structure of the bypass hearing situates minors as suspect, the expression of
display or remorse is tricky. Talking to clergy or otherwise reflecting on
one’s religion as part of the decision-making process is sometimes regarded
as an indication of moral responsibility, and some advocates urge their
clients to consider doing so before the hearing.257 Looking at the ultrasound
images of one’s fetus has also been taken as evidence that the minor took
her decision seriously.258 But the minor’s “appreciation of the moral and
religious dilemma presented by her decision” is a factor that courts have
taken into consideration in a maturity determination.259
This is not to say that all questions pertaining to responsibility are
improper. A measure of maturity might reasonably include a plan for
contraception in the future so that the judge is more confident that the
young woman will not again return to court for this reason. (Petitions have
been denied where it was a minor’s second pregnancy.)260 Some advocates
therefore prepare their clients for questioning on their current birth control
practices, explaining its relevance to the client.261
256
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author) [hereinafter Advocate Interviews].
257
NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, supra note 59, at 14 (“Some judges
question minors about the morality of abortion. One lawyer makes it a point to question a
minor before the hearing about her religion . . . with one particular judge, her client might
reply, ‘I know it’s a mortal sin but I believe my God is a compassionate God and He will
forgive me.’ Another lawyer tells her clients to talk to their pastors before the hearing so they
can assure the judge they have done so.”).
258

In re Jane Doe IV, 19 S.W.3d 337, 339 (Tex. 2000).

259

In re Doe, 967 So.2d 1017, 1020 (Fla. App. 2007); see also In re Jane Doe, 19
S.W.3d 346, 361 (Tex. 2000), in which the minor testified that “she understood that many
women experience guilt after an abortion” but that “all of her choices would involve guilt,
[and] that she felt most comfortable with the decision to have an abortion.” Id.
260

See In re T.P, 475 N.E. 2d 312 (Ind. 1985); see also Advocate Interviews, supra

note 256.
261

Advocate Interviews, supra note 256.

2009]

Decisional Dignity

469

There should be concern, however, when the law requires anyone to
offer up a particular presentation of self or sentiment as a prerequisite to
exercising a right. The practice is particularly objectionable in the fraught
circumstances of a bypass hearing. As we have seen in the criminal context,
much is at stake if the defendant is unconvincing or unwilling to show
remorse. In seventeenth-century England, the condemned were expected to
give a repentance speech from the gallows, broadcasting their acceptance of
guilt and hope for redemption.262 These were practices of criminal justice
centuries ago. But pregnant girls should not have to assume a (moral)
position or play a set piece in a contrived morality play when choosing to
end a pregnancy.
My argument is not that the bypass system would be improved if
only minors were encouraged to tell their own stories. The heart of the
problem is less a matter of testimonial authenticity than that minors are
required to tell stories in court at all. I recognize that this goes counter to
advocates’ insights regarding the importance of a client’s “voice.”263 In her
influential reflection on representing a welfare client at an administrative
hearing for fraud, Lucie White analyzed how the hearing worked to shape
Mrs. G’s testimony into what White calls “subordinated speech.”264 The
hearing was marked by intimidation (there was much to lose) and a kind of
built-in humiliation (the client came into the process as a cheat). Each of
these is familiar in the bypass setting.
To be sure, there are some impressive counterexamples of litigants
who refuse subordination. Catherine Connolly has written about the
“steadfast refusal” of certain lesbian clients to conform to society’s
expectations of family, even in the high-stakes context of a second-parent
adoption.265 This is all to the good, but we should keep in mind that these
262
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were sophisticated, powerful adult litigants who had strategized about when
and where to bring their actions. Connolly explains that her clients had
chosen “to use the law only when they felt the time was ripe for them and
their children.”266 In contrast, bypass petitioners rarely appear in the peak of
confidence. Certainly many must scramble to find a court in which to be
heard at all, and few have any ability to “pick their moment,” since time,
not timing, is crucial to them. Many lawyers do their best to secure
respectful treatment for their bypass clients, but teenage abortion is not the
right place to work on improving the integrity of client narrative. The
courthouse is the wrong forum for pregnant minors to work out anything.
What they have to say may be compelling, but it should not be compelled.
V. PURPOSE AND PUNISHMENT
Let us return for a moment to sixteenth-century France. It appears
that by the middle of that century almost all letters of remission brought
before the king were ratified.267 This led to concerns that pardons were
being granted too easily and granted to the well-connected rather than the
deserving. Yet, despite such misgivings, the practice continued because in
addition to pardoning wrongdoers, it also served important functions of
state.268 Remember that receiving a pardon required playing by the king’s
rules. This meant presenting oneself as someone who had only momentarily
lost control of an otherwise upstanding life. It is here that the demands of
narrative worked smoothly with objectives of state building:
The habit of language insisted upon in the letters of remission and
the roles in which supplicants were required to present
themselves were among the civilizing mechanisms of the early
modern French state, reminding people subjectively of the locus
of power. . . .269

The fact that pardons were so generously granted led to their “double
reputation” in the sixteenth century: “they were simultaneously believed in
266
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as a needed mechanism for social peace and reintegration, and scoffed at as
a sham.”270
Like letters of remission, bypass petitions are also widely
granted.271 Might they also have the same double reputation as their
sixteenth-century counterparts?272 Part VI takes up the question of the
hearings as sham, but here I want to consider how the hearings, like pardon
tales, satisfy the needs of social order. To do this it helps to ask just what
functions the hearings serve. The question of purpose is an important one:
as citizens, we should reasonably expect to know the purpose of a law so
that we can decide if that purpose is worthy as well as to assess whether the
law accomplishes its intended purpose, or any other. While the bypass
hearings may serve multiple purposes, I focus here on one. This is the use
of bypass hearings to punish young women seeking an abortion. The
hearings are a deliberate and rather clever form of punishment for a
reproductive decision that is subject to no other form of state sanction
because abortion is now legal. The hearings act as a sophisticated shaming
mechanism, an engagement with law that appears on the up and up but that
intensifies the minor’s humiliation and fear (of participation, of exposure, of
outcome) precisely because it takes place in a court of law. Moreover, I
suggest that the harms experienced by virtue of the hearings are not simply
incidental to the bypass process but are intended as an integral part of it.
A. Deterrence
In characterizing bypass hearings as punitive, I use the word not in
the criminal sense of the deprivation of liberty or a fine, but rather to
describe action that is intended either as retribution or deterrent. We are
familiar with this usage in other non-criminal contexts: punitive damages,
punitive interest rates, and so on. The idea in all of these is to sanction and
so to discourage behavior that is deemed offensive but that falls short of a
criminal offense.
The idea of the hearings as a deterrent is interesting, although
whether it is sex, pregnancy, or abortion that is to be deterred, it is hard to
say. Most minors have no idea parental involvement laws exist until they
discover they are pregnant and begin investigating their options. There is
270
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nothing, for example, about parental involvement laws in present state sexeducation curricula. To the extent these laws mean to deter anything, it
seems to be the hearings themselves. While presented as alternatives—
“your parents or a hearing”—the two are not offered up as equal choices.
Girls are meant to choose the parental path on the understanding that
something worse awaits them if they don’t. As one Texas Supreme Court
justice candidly explained, “[o]nce a minor becomes aware of what she
must go through to obtain a judicial bypass, she will choose for herself to
involve her parents.”273 Of course, the in terrorem effect does not work
entirely as hoped. Hearings take place. Parents are bypassed. Indeed, it is
impossible to measure the extent to which the bypass process works at all;
we simply don’t know whether or how many girls decide to notify their
parents when faced with a hearing. We do know, however, that more than
half of all pregnant minors inform their parents even without a legal
requirement to do so.274 For those girls who petition, it seems that only the
terror and not the effect remains.
But on the general point, let us not be coy. The bypass process is
meant to prevent abortion. As four justices of the Alabama Supreme Court
candidly stated:
[I]t seems clear that the [Alabama] legislature intended, in
adopting the Parental Consent Statute, to preserve the life of the
unborn, and that it deliberately was doing what it could within the
constraints of the Federal Constitution, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court of the United States, to accomplish that
purpose.275

The means of preserving unborn life is understood to be parental
suasion or control. Thus an Alabama judge held that the court lacked
jurisdiction “to order the procedure sought in this matter which will result in
the extinction of a four-month old human life when the child’s family is
fully informed and able to make this decision.”276 Of course, we don’t really
know whether all parents would oppose their daughter’s decision; the
Alabama judge might be as distressed if the minor’s family agreed with
273
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their daughter, consented, and helped her arrange the abortion. In any event,
as the Alabama Supreme Court justices themselves acknowledged, abortion
is constitutionally protected. Legislating as close as possible to the
permissible line as an expression of constitutional dismay doesn’t seem
good enough, especially when the exercise of a right and the quality of its
exercise is at stake.
B. Counseling and Consent
Might the hearings serve a counseling function? Certainly nothing
in the statutes authorizes judges to do more than assess a minor’s maturity
and best interests. Moreover, most judges have no interest—and few have
any training—in counseling minors about pregnancy resolution. Beyond
disinterest and inability, there has been concern about the nature of
counseling that has been offered. Some judges have been unwaveringly
judgmental and moralistic: an Alaskan judge denied a minor’s petition on
the ground that it was “not an act of maturity on her part to put the burden
of the death of this child upon the conscience of the Court”;277 petitioners in
Alabama have been ordered to undergo counseling at a pro-life pregnancy
center called Sav-a-Life.278
This is not to say that counseling in general is a bad idea. It is a
standard and valued service provided by private organizations such as
Planned Parenthood and Jane’s Due Process (JDP). A glimpse through the
JDP booklet, Legal Rights for Pregnant Teenagers in Texas, is instructive:
it offers nonjudgmental information on resources and services offered to
minors, not just regarding abortion, but on parenting, adoption, education,
emancipation and child support.279 Indeed, to the extent that anything good
has come out of the bypass process, it may be the extrajudicial system of
assistance for pregnant minors that has in some places arisen in its wake.280
An additional justification for the hearings is that they ensure that
the minor’s consent will be voluntary. The issue of voluntariness appears
277
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regularly in the politics of bypass enactment. The argument is that
permitting teen abortion without parental involvement or a judicial hearing
is simply a gift to abusive adult men who will impregnate girls and force
them to abort. (Let us put aside cases where minors have been impregnated
by their own fathers).281 In the 2008 California initiative campaign, a
leading pro-parental involvement message was “Stop Child Predators: On a
daily basis, older men exploit young girls and use secret abortions to cover
up their crimes.”282 In a 2007 Mississippi case, that charge was extended to
include mothers too. In Sherron v. State, a mother consented to an abortion
for her fourteen year old daughter under the state parental involvement
laws.283 The pregnancy was the result of rape by the daughter’s stepfather.
The mother was charged and convicted as an accessory after the fact to her
husband’s crime of statutory rape for “giving the assistance that her
daughter had to receive from one of her parents if she was to be permitted
an abortion without a court order.”284 The mother had argued that her sole
intent in consenting was to help her daughter;285 the daughter has testified
that she had “no doubts about wanting to have an abortion. She did not want
to give birth to and raise a child fathered by [her step-father].”286
Nonetheless, the jury found sufficient evidence to suggest the mother’s
motives in consenting were mixed and that consent for the abortion was
given in part to hide her husband’s crime.287 The court declined to rule on
whether the criminal prosecution of a mother who consents to a daughter’s
abortion unduly burdens the minor’s recognized constitutional right.288
Doctors too are viewed as sources of coercion. There is much prolife discussion about the abortion “industry” and some of this has found its
281
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way into bypass decisions. An Alabama judge denied a petition on the
ground that the minor was not sufficiently informed. Despite having
received counseling from medical staff at a clinic, she had been unable to
talk personally with the physician who would perform the abortion. The
judge stated, “You know, these people are interested in one thing it appears
to me and this is getting this young lady’s money. . . . This is a beautiful
young girl with a bright future and she does not need to have a butcher get
ahold of her.”289 The denial was upheld on appeal. In this case, when asked
about the specifics of the abortion procedure, the minor had testified that:
I understand they have a local anesthetic which they’ll give you
anesthesia. They also have this oral medicine that you can take.
When you take that, it numbs the bottom half of your body. And
they would go in with an aspirator which is like a vacuum or
sucking machine. And they go in there around the uterus wall and
they just suck it out. That is what they [three different nurses at
different clinics] told me.290

In all other forms of medical treatment, society trusts the physician
to assess the quality of the patient’s consent.291 Society is generally satisfied
that doctors behave professionally with regard to the provision of services,
and any lingering insecurities are assuaged by the presence of the tort
system and a robust understanding within the medical community of the
meaning of “battery.” Even for minors, there is little concern about coercion
with regard to other medical care for which parental consent is not required,
such as contraception or treatment for sexually transmitted diseases. In this
respect, abortion is exceptional and judicial supervision duplicative.
Physicians must always make an independent determination about the
voluntariness of a patient’s consent. Maryland has codified this rule for teen
abortion; a physician may perform an abortion on a minor if, in his
professional judgment, “the minor is mature and capable of giving informed
consent.”292
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C. Bypass Symbolism
So we return to the question of what functions bypass hearings
serve. Certainly they have expressive or symbolic value, though we want to
look closely at just what they express before deciding the purpose is useful,
benign, or deserving of support. For some, the legislation stands as a
statement of opposition to abortion. But bypass symbolism goes beyond
opposition to abortion because teenage abortion is more than a decision
about reproduction. Bypass laws pull together a bundle of testy issues—
teenage sexuality and sexual practices, parental and filial obedience, unwed
motherhood and reproductive control. In the good old days, each of these
was a matter of great interest to law. Until the 1970s, courts were formally
on the side of parents. Sexual activity was a common basis of status offense
jurisdiction over girls;293 pregnancy was grounds for school expulsion.
Maintaining this sense of moral order was upheld by the medical
community as well as by law. Physicians who served on hospital
committees that assessed women’s requests for abortion were “very
concerned with what they took to be their role in the postwar cultural
mandate to protects and preserve the links between sexuality, femininity,
marriage and maternity.”294
But reform schools, maternity homes, and hospital abortion
committees are now a thing of the past; pregnant high-schoolers are no
longer expelled and abortion is legal. This is a matter of dismay for some.
Parents particularly may feel that they are unsupported and that things have
gone badly out of control. On this account, parental bypass legislation
symbolizes resistance and perhaps a bit of nostalgia. It is not for nothing
that Michigan calls its statute the Parental Rights Restoration Act.295 The
very existence of a parental involvement statute demonstrates that, in this
state anyway, abortion is not available “on demand,” especially for
teenagers who have gone out and gotten themselves pregnant. It is, of
course, important to keep in mind that abortion is not available “on
demand” for anybody. Even adult women must comply with the sizeable set
of requirements discussed earlier, and all of these apply to minors as well.296
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To be sure, the value of bypass hearings is not only symbolic. It is
also political, to the extent the two can be pulled apart. Throughout the
1980s, support for parental involvement statutes proved crucial in several
contested gubernatorial campaigns, including those of otherwise
progressive governors like Bill Clinton and Christine Whitman, who, by
supporting restrictions on abortion for daughters, successfully straddled the
family values fence by being pro-choice and pro-parent at the same time.297
Legislators can even manage to be pro-teen, if pressed, by supporting the
therapeutic benefits of bypass hearings for minors’ mental and physical
health.
But there has to be a more robust answer to why bypass legislation
makes any sense than the fact that it makes legislators and some parents
look tough. If even in the face of a daunting hearing, girls are still going to
court, and still succeeding, then it is important to understand what the
hearings are about.
D. Punishment
Here we circle back to the deeply troubling hypothesis that bypass
hearings operate as a form of punishment. The hearings cause, and are
intended to cause, great distress to vulnerable young women who are
already experiencing the predicaments of unwanted pregnancy in
circumstances of perceived isolation from their families. As the Texas
Supreme Court justice quoted above reminds us, bypass laws are meant to
“sufficiently impress[] upon minors . . . that the State wants the parents to
be informed.”298 But the impression has force only if the hearing is
understood and functions as an ordeal. It is not hard to understand how that
comes about. Unhappily pregnant girls learn when they seek medical care
that in order to have an abortion they must first file papers, talk to a lawyer,
testify in court, and each time review and rehearse details of their home
lives, contraceptive failures, and private hopes for the future.
The hearings are, in short, the price young women are expected to
pay for seeking an abortion and for having sex, and for doing both without
owning up to their parents. As the presiding judge of an Ohio juvenile court
may be at some distance, requiring her either to arrange transportation or stay overnight
away from home. Both are problematic.
297
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told a minor’s attorney after denying the petition of his college-bound
client, she had just not had enough “hard knocks.”299 Parents too sometimes
regard bypass participation as the proper price of ending a pregnancy.
Lawyers representing pregnant minors report that some parents have
refused to consent after being asked by their daughter, even knowing that
she is likely to succeed at the hearing: “You have to go through judicial
bypass. This is your responsibility, not mine.”300 Interestingly, the “hard
knock” school of thought also seems to apply to teenagers who decide not
to abort. In describing the efforts of pregnant minors to continue their
schooling, the head of Pregnant Related Services at the Texas Education
Agency explained, “There are certainly districts where pregnancy is still
punished . . . . Every year we get calls from parents and students saying
their district just tells them, ‘you’ve made your bed and now you lie in it
because we’re not going to help you.’”301
As these comments reveal, those who administer the law are indeed
often able to “work their own view of substantive justice into the law.”302 At
one level, the phenomenon is not surprising. As Malcolm Feeley has noted,
“[t]he law is a normative ordering that touches people in an important way.
Criminal justice officials are not exempt from this; most respond intensely
to their tasks, and how they perform their duties is determined in part by
their sense of justice.”303 Legal abortion offends the sense of justice of some
judges. A Mississippi Supreme Court justice put it clearly in a 2001
opinion: “Ever since the abomination known as Roe v. Wade became the
law of the land, the morality of our great nation has slipped ever so
downwards to the point that the decision to spare the life of an unborn child
has become an arbitrary decision based on convenience.”304
I suspect the question will be raised: what’s so bad about a little
slap on the wrist by process if girls can get their abortions? One answer is
that the law reserves punishment for those convicted of wrongdoing, and on
299
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that score, bypass petitioners don’t qualify. They have filed a civil petition
in a non-adversarial action: there is no prosecutor, no indictment, no
sentencing. Even so, the procedure often “reads” as criminal all the way
down. Bypass petitioners are clear about this. As one Massachusetts minor
put it, “I’m only 16, and usually at this age, you know you don’t see people
going to court for good things.”305 It is as though if abortion can’t be made
illegal, it can still be made to feel illegal.
It is not enough to say that some people think that subjecting young
women to this form of humiliation is just what they deserve or is only a
small price for them to pay. In the Isle of Mann “birching” case discussed
earlier, the state had similarly argued that the “judicial corporal punishment
at issue in this case was not in breach of the Convention since it did not
outrage public opinion.”306 The European Court rejected this view:
Even assuming that local public opinion can have an incidence on
the interpretation of the concept of “degrading punishment”
appearing in Article 3, the Court does not regard it as established
that judicial corporal punishment is not considered degrading by
those members of the Manx population who favour its retention:
it might well be that one of the reasons why they view the penalty
as an effective deterrent is precisely the element of degradation
which it involves.307

VI. HARM TO THE LEGAL PROCESS
I have focused on harms that bypass hearings impose on young
women. But the legal system itself is compromised by virtue of the process.
The hearings produce an engagement with law which challenges the
integrity of the legal process in a number of ways, and I look here at
several: the problem of ritualization and of sham, hearings as politicized
shaming mechanisms and as the source of disillusionment with law, the
“luck of the draw” problem, and the illegitimacy of denying minors a
forum.
I turn first to the issue of ritual and sham and look at divorce
hearings brought by unhappily married couples in the period before nofault. These hearings, which led to the downfall of fault-based divorce, shed
significant light on the bypass process and perhaps on its future. In
305
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considering whether bypass hearings have aspects of sham hearings, I want
to be clear that many bypass judges diligently attempt to discern whether a
petitioner has adequately proved her maturity or best interests. Yet, many
other bypass judges seem to fall into one of two categories: those who
approve nearly all petitions and those who grant none at all. Judges who
commonly grant petitions may be operating on something like a
presumption that minors who are able to organize participation in a hearing
have by that fact alone come close to demonstrating maturity. Those who
grant none are generally opposed to abortion on religious grounds, or are
opposed to granting a bypass petition on political ones. In either case, it
might be argued there is little deep inquiry into the minor’s maturity,
although the appellate cases suggest this has been particularly so with
regard to denials.
Several factors combine to bring about this result. One is the
capaciousness of the standards for maturity and best interests that judge are
to apply. But these standards are nothing new: in the area of child custody,
for example, judges use them all the time. Why then should bypass cases
prove so problematic? Part of the answer is the intrusion of politics into the
hearing, where the contentious topic of abortion is posed center stage. At
the same time, each individual bypass hearing is not intended as a private
referendum on the question of abortion.
A. Fault-Based Divorce: Hearings as Sham
Before grounds for divorce were modified to include the allencompassing “irreconcilable differences,” a divorce petitioner had to plead
and prove specific grounds of misconduct such as adultery, desertion,
various degrees of cruelty, and habitual alcoholism.308 Spouses who had not
deserted one another or been cruel or adulterous (and had no desire to be)
were in a pinch. If these couples wanted to divorce, they had to engage in a
different sort of misconduct: collusion, the agreement to testify falsely that
one or the other had engaged in one of the fault-based behaviors.309 In states
that required corroboration, parties brought in “correspondents,”
professional accomplices who were paid not to engage in actual wrong308

See generally HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1988).
309

See Walter Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV.
32, 33–34 (1966) (noting that common fabrications included “statements of domiciliary
intent,” “false allegations and testimony by one spouse as to non-existent cruel acts or
vicious attacks,” and “antisocial behavior ranging from perjury to mock or actual adultery”).
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doing but to testify that they had done so.310 Lawrence Friedman explains
that “this meant that the plaintiff not only had to lie herself, she had to bring
in an auxiliary liar as well.”311 Despite the fact that collusion was a bar to
divorce, the practice was rampant.312 Friedman notes that after 1870, most
divorces were collusive: “there was no real courtroom dispute . . . [t]he
‘lawsuit’ was essentially a sham.”313
How did unhappy spouses become so sophisticated in figuring out
how to bypass the strictures of fault-based divorce? The answer is that they
were instructed by able matrimonial attorneys who tutored their clients not
only on what to wear during staged indiscretions but on how to plead and
testify in court.314 Lawyers would lead the aggrieved spouse through a
series of questions to which she would reply in monosyllables:
Q: [Mrs. X], during your marriage to Mr. X, has he on many
occasions been cold and indifferent to you?
A: Yes.
Q: And as a result of this conduct on the part of your husband,
have you become seriously ill, nervous, and upset?
A: Yes.315

The example was typical of “the melancholy and perfunctory litany
of uncontested divorce, recited daily in courtrooms throughout the State.”316
310

For a wonderful account of how this worked in practice, see EVELYN WAUGH, A
HANDFUL OF DUST (1999).
311

Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before
No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1507 (2000).
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Roscoe Pound, Foreword, The Law of Divorce, 28 IOWA L. REV. 179, 184
(1943). The doctrine of collusion had “little force . . . in practice. Consider what any
American community would think of a man convicted of extreme physical cruelty to his wife
if those words (extreme cruelty) were taken seriously. But there are respected persons of
high standing in every community against whom there are such records.” Id.
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In sum, divorce hearings consisted of perjury-filled testimony organized by
the bar, performed by the litigants, and tolerated by the bench: “[t]he law
was an ostrich; it was part of its formal strategy to bury its head in the
sand.”317
In describing this process, the point is not that these unhappy
couples should have been required to remain married. It was not the result
of the hearings that was perverse, but rather the corruption of legal process
to reach the result. Over time, the nature of the process provoked the radical
reform of the underlying rule. That so many husbands and wives were
willing to swear to invented affairs and cruelty finally persuaded everyone
that the law should accommodate their marital preferences rather than
suborn their testimony. According to the influential California Governor’s
Commission on the Family, the introduction of no-fault divorce “will put an
end to the dissimulation, hypocrisy—and even outright perjury—which is
engendered by the present system.”318 The notoriety of their own complicity
brought the fault-based system down, as judges and attorneys became
unable to participate in a charade of justice.319
Are bypass hearings also simply performances by pregnant teens
who will say whatever it takes to get to yes? No, I am not suggesting that
teenage petitioners, like divorce litigants of old, make things up in their
hearings. They want an abortion and they can describe, if sometimes in
teenspeak, the circumstances of their lives that led them to make this
decision and to do so without formally involving a parent.
Nonetheless, something like the ritualistic recitations of the faultbased divorce hearings can sometimes be found in the bypass context. As
one disgruntled Texas judge stated, “Doe’s evidence that she is mature and
sufficiently well informed is very limited, consisting almost entirely of
monosyllabic answers to conclusory questions posed by her counsel.”320 In
affirming the denial of bypass petition, a Florida court noted that:
In a similar vein showing failure to develop facts, i.e., sufficient
evidence rather than conclusory statements, her counsel asked
Ms. Doe if she had considered all the alternatives to terminating
317

Friedman, supra note 311, at 1507.

318

GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON THE FAMILY, supra note 315, at 267–70.
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Richard C. Dinkelspiel & Aidan R. Gough, The Case for a Family Court—a
Summary of the Report of the California Governor’s Commission on the Family, 1 FAM. L.Q.
70, 70 (1967).
320

In re Jane Doe IV, 19 S.W.3d 322, 324 (Tex. 2000).
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her pregnancy. The monosyllabic answer was “yes.” When asked
if she had given her decision to terminate the pregnancy long and
thoughtful consideration, she answered “Mm hm.” When asked if
this had been a difficult decision to arrive at, she answered again
simply “yes.”321

It seems that judges fear they are being scammed by monosyllables.
(A similar suspicion arose in the quasi-legal hospital review boards of the
1950s and 1960s; one board physician “spoke for many of his colleagues
when he warned of the ‘clever, scheming women, simply trying to
hoodwink the psychiatrist and the obstetrician’ when they asked permission
to abort.”)322 If a “yes” or an “mm hm” satisfies as evidence of maturity, do
the hearings not have something in common with the stylized recitations of
fault-based divorce? On the other hand, monosyllabic yes and no answers
might be more manageable for young women on the stand than detailed
judicial interrogations into their moral reasoning and birth control habits. It
may also be reasonable in a hearing where the minor’s demeanor may count
for everything, for her attorney to examine her in a more direct fashion.
Certainly judges may intervene and ask questions (as many do) if they find
the advocate’s questions or the petitioner’s answers lacking.323
Many judges do not intervene because they believe nothing more is
necessary. Consider the earnest testimony of a Minnesota judge, one of a
small cohort responsible for hearing most of the state’s bypass cases:
I know as a judge you would like to think your decisions are
important, that you are providing some—you are doing some
legitimate purpose. What I have come to believe . . . [is] that
really the judicial function is merely a rubber stamp. The decision
has already been made before they have gotten to my chambers.
The young women I have seen have been very mature and
capable of giving the required consent.324
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Id. at 553 (“It was the judge, not the minor’s attorney, who attempted to elicit
testimony from the minor regarding why she did not want to have her parents notified and
who pressed her for additional information when her answer was simply that she thought her
parents would not understand.”).
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Another Minnesota judge characterized his function as “a routine clerical
function on my part, just like putting my seal and stamp on it.”325 There is
no thought here that the judiciary of Minnesota is lax. Rather, it appears that
most judges accept that pregnant teenagers who have demonstrated the
wherewithal to complete and file legal papers, meet with counsel, and come
to court are mature enough to decide about an abortion. While taking charge
of a predicament in this way may not be absolute proof of maturity, it
would seem persuasive indeed.
B. HUAC and Shame
This aspect of the bypass process—hearings where the important
facts are known at the outset—is illuminated by another well-known
example from the mid-twentieth century, the hearings held by the U.S.
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) in the early 1950s to
investigate the supposed disloyalty of citizens suspected of having ties to
the Communist Party. A prominent feature of these public, televised
hearings was the testimony of subpoenaed witnesses asked to “name
names” of colleagues or others known to them to have Communist ties. But
as Victor Navasky has explained, the Committee already had the names:
“the witnesses who named names publicly preceded their public testimony
with private, executive-session rehearsals, which means that the public
hearings were indeed largely ceremonial.”326 What purpose did the hearings
then serve? Navasky argues that they were simply “degradation
ceremonies”; the public recitation was simply “the final proof that a witness
had broken with his past.”327
The comparison with bypass hearings is not a happy one. While we
can appreciate a difference between degradation and humiliation,328 the
difference may not signify much for the minor herself. The hearings are
humiliating for participants, whether they are closely questioned by a judge
or simply led through the basics by their own attorney. The testimony of
325

Id.
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Id. at 318.

328
For the difference between objective aspects of degradation and subjective
aspects of humiliation, see Jeremy Waldron, Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment: The
Words Themselves 39–40 (Nov. 11, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with NYU
School of Law, Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1278604.
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bypass petitioners is more private than that of witnesses called before
HUAC, but it is still a compelled performance concerning the speaker’s
innermost commitments, here familial (do I want a child now?) rather than
political.
And just as the HUAC hearings were staged to combat a subversive
political threat to the American way of life, on some accounts legal abortion
is similarly understood as a subversive threat to cherished values. For some,
abortion undermines a way things once seemed to be, a world of obedient
daughters and orderly families. For others, abortion itself is the threat. For
still others—and the categories are not exclusive—the hearings represent an
objectionable and on-going form of judicial activism that started with
Roe.329 As we have seen, each of these anxieties appears in reported bypass
case law as well as in the unreported law produced and experienced,
hearing by hearing. The law discredits itself by using pro forma hearings to
put girls through the wringer when there is little factual doubt about the
decisional maturity of a particular petitioner. Yet there is an additional
reason why judicial bypass hearings serve the law badly. They produce not
only dread before the experience and humiliation during, but
disillusionment with justice after.
C. Fairness and Legitimacy
As noted earlier, encounters with courts are where many people
form their impressions of the American justice system.330 Tom Tyler has
explained that “if judges treat [people] fairly by listening to their arguments,
by being neutral, and by stating good reasons for his or her decision, people
will react positively to their experience,” whatever the substantive
outcome.331 In this way procedural fairness is understood to increase law’s
legitimacy.
329

Appellate judges in Alabama dispute which of them is the worst judicial
activist, those who uphold trial court denials of bypass petitions or those who find some
denials are erroneous:
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Do bypass hearings meet these basic criteria of neutrality and
fairness? Certainly not in every instance. We have seen petitions denied for
reasons that defy the logic of the process, as when the minor’s pregnancy
itself is declared the ground for immaturity.
The disillusioning practices of unfairness take other forms as well,
as when judges apply the law in ways that disregard any plausible principle
of charity inherent in the concept of fairness. Consider a 2008 Florida
bypass case in which a seventeen-year-old high school senior was asked
about her plans after graduation.332 She replied that she was “going to go to
H.C.C. [Hillsborough Community College] for two years and then . . .
transferring to U.S.F. [University of South Florida] for maybe a
pharmaceutical degree or a pediatrician.”333 Her petition was denied on the
grounds of immaturity, and much hinged on the meaning of the word
“plan.” In affirming the denial, the judge explained that:
Ms. Doe’s testimony is indicative of an educational aspiration or
ultimate career goal. It is not, however, indicative of a plan . . . .
For example, as a senior in high school, and midway through the
academic year, evidence that she had in fact submitted an
application for admission to the educational institution she
identified would suggest a true plan. Generally, admission
requires an appropriate test score from a recognized testing
organization. The taking of such a test is substantial factual
evidence of a plan. Proof of acceptance, in my view, would
provide further factual support, although being denied acceptance
does not indicate lack of a plan or lack of maturity. Alternatively,
testimony that Ms. Doe is presently embarking on her plan and
has identified the requirements for admission would also have
been of evidentiary value. . . . I do not imply that she has not
done these things, only that she failed to present to the trial judge
sufficient, detailed evidence of mature behavior in furthering any
plan for her education . . . .334

What are we to make of this speech? Certainly it provides guidance
for Florida attorneys advising subsequent bypass petitioners about preparing
a more detailed evidentiary record in the short and intense moments of
consultation they have with their clients. But it also shows that if a judge
332
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wants to find a girl immature, there is almost always room to do so. I do not
know the application deadlines for Hillsborough Community College, and I
suspect neither did the judge. Maybe the Florida Jane Doe will never end up
as a pediatrician or pharmacist. But she has grasped the relationship
between her educational aspirations and motherhood; she does understand
how one progresses from local to regional schools. One suspects that even
she understood that her failure to provide her SAT scores is not why her
petition was denied.
On occasion, the relation between the integrity of the justice system
and truly egregious judicial conduct regarding the bypass process is
recognized and addressed. In 1992, trial judge Francis Bourisseau gave a
news interview in which he stated that he might grant a bypass petition in
the case of a white girl raped by a black man.335 In affirming his censure,
the Michigan Supreme Court held that these remarks were “clearly
prejudicial to the administration of justice”; the judge’s conduct “called into
question the impartiality of the judiciary, and exposed the judicial system to
contempt and ridicule.”336 But it is worth looking at Judge Bourisseau’s
remarks and the court’s objections to them more closely. In the full
interview, the judge had stated that he didn’t want to have “blood on his
hands” for participating in permitting abortions at all; 337 the racialized rape
example was simply an exception to his general policy of denying all
bypass petitions. That judicial conduct—ordinary day to day denials
because the judge thinks abortion is murder—is not generally regarded as
subjecting the system to contempt, though it cannot be fairly regarded
otherwise.
D. The Dignitarian Luck of the Draw
Not all judges who oppose abortion, or who for reasons of electoral
politics refuse to be associated with authorizing an abortion, call into
question the impartiality of the judiciary. The outcome of a petition may

335
In re Bourisseau, 480 N.W.2d 270 (Mich. 1992). The Bourisseau case is now
used as an example of “bias towards litigants” in chapter nine of the JUDICIAL EDUC. CTR. OF
N.M., JUDICIAL ETHICS HANDBOOK (2004), available at http://jec.unm.edu/resources/judicial
_handbook/ethics/index.htm.
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depend entirely on who hears the case. Consider the heartfelt statement of
an Ohio judge:
It’s really tough. I’m as Roman Catholic as you can get and I
follow the church’s teachings. But where these cases come before
the court, I must follow the law. Whether I agree with (a girl’s)
decision is another matter.338

But there is something terribly wrong with a legal procedure that
can be aptly captured by the headline of an investigative story in the local
paper, “Abortion Waivers are a Judicial Crapshoot.”339 I recognize that to
some extent, luck is always a feature of the administration of justice.340
Nonetheless, there should be limits on the system’s tolerance for luck,
especially when luck determines not only the outcome, but finding a forum
in the first place and how forum finders are treated throughout the process.
This aspect of the process—the luck of the draw aspect—relates
directly to the concept of dignity. In analyzing what is wrong with shaming
sanctions—such as publishing the names, pictures, and crimes of convicted
offenders—James Q. Whitman has observed that objections to shaming
often rest on the liberal argument that there are limits on how the state may
punish: depriving a person of liberty or property is acceptable; depriving
them of dignity is not.341 Toni Massaro explains that shaming mechanisms
“authorize public officials to search for and destroy or damage an
offender’s dignity . . . [which is] an Orwellian prospect.”342 But there is
another way in which shaming implicates dignity. Whitman argues that
shaming is a “peculiarly disturbing species of lynch justice”; it works
338
Phil Trexler, Abortion Fiery Issue for Judges, AKRON BEACON J., Nov. 9, 2003,
at A1 (quoting Franklin County Juvenile Court Judge Lias). See also Larry Cunningham,
Can a Catholic Lawyer Represent a Minor Seeking a Judicial Bypass for an Abortion?, 44
CATH. LAW. 379 (2006). For a discussion of whether granting a bypass petition is, from a
pro-life perspective, cooperating in evil, see Eric Parker Babbas, Pro-Life Judges and
Judicial Bypass Cases, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y. 473, 489–97 (2008)
(arguing that pro-life judges should either recuse themselves from the case or resign).
339
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because of “an ugly complicity” between the state and the crowd. Because a
shamed offender does not know just how far the public will go with the
information, or just what they will do, shaming acts as a kind of “posseraising legal politics.”343 This violates what Whitman identifies as
“transactional dignity:
a deeply rooted norm of our society that persons should never be
forced to deal with wild or unpredictable partners. . . . It is the
dignity involved in having the right to know what kind of deal
one has struck, and on what terms.344

This conception of dignity illuminates the bypass process with
regard to the predictability of encounters between legal subjects and the
state. Serendipity is not supposed to be embedded in, nor tolerated by, the
processes by which people exercise their rights. The deal minors have
struck, or have been handed, is to participate in a hearing before a judge.
They are not assured that every petition will be granted, but they are
entitled to have their petitions accepted and their evidence evaluated fairly.
This is the core of the “transaction” that we consider legal process to be.
Unpredictability occasioned by moral or political disagreement on the part
of a judge shakes this deeply rooted norm, the more so since it is not the
crowd but the court itself whom petitioners have reason to fear.
I am not suggesting that bypass judges act like vigilantes exactly,
treating bypass petitioners as many communities treat child molesters,
trying to run them out of town by offering them no quarter.345 Nonetheless,
some judges have closed their courthouses to would-be petitioners, and
others have made it possible to identify petitioners who are then subject to
whatever informal sanctions come their way. Philosopher Jeffrie Murphy
has characterized shaming punishments as “coercive exercise[s] in
humiliation and degradation—a kind of smug and mean-spirited vengeance
with tendencies to lap into arbitrary cruelty.”346 We have already seen
examples of mean-spiritedness in the bypass context, but we should not lose
sight of the arbitrariness of it all.
343
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E. The Illegitimacy of Forum Exclusion
Finally, I want to consider the problem of forum exclusion not only
as unacceptably burdening minors, but as unacceptably discrediting the
legal system itself. The U.S. Supreme Court considered this problem in a
somewhat different context in the early 1970s. At that time the state of
Connecticut charged couples seeking a divorce sixty dollars in fees and
costs.347 Representing a class of indigent women seeking to divorce,
plaintiff Gladys Boddie argued that because she couldn’t afford the sixty
dollars, she was denied access to the court and thus to due process itself,
even in a civil matter.348 Deciding for Boddie, the Court made two
foundational observations. The first was that Connecticut had created a
monopoly over the dissolution of marriage: spouses who sought to divorce
could do so only through the judicial process.349 Second, the Court
acknowledged the state’s long-standing interest in the institution of
marriage.350 The two combined to create a circumstance in which a judicial
hearing was “the exclusive precondition to the adjustment of a fundamental
human relationship.”351
In holding that “due process requires, at a minimum, that absent a
countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to
settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be
given a meaningful opportunity to be heard,”352 the Court recognized that
all earlier cases concerning access to court involved criminal defendants,
not civil plaintiffs. Nonetheless, it characterized Boddie’s “plight . . . [as]
akin to that of defendants faced with exclusion from the only forum
effectively empowered to settle their disputes.”353 Her “resort to the judicial
process . . . is no more voluntary in a realistic sense than that of the
defendant called upon to defend his interests in court. For both groups this

347
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process is not only the paramount dispute-settlement technique, but, in fact,
the only available one.”354
The plight of a bypass petitioner denied access to a bypass hearing
is similarly akin to that of Mrs. Boddie (and, by implication, to the criminal
defendant as well). Certainly there are differences: bypass exclusions result
not from rules of court but from a judge’s personal preference, and, unlike
divorce litigants locked in by residency requirements, bypass petitioners
may be able to travel and obtain either a hearing or an abortion in another
state. But there are crucial similarities. Abortion is a matter in which the
state has a great interest, and, like divorce, it too involves “the adjustment
of a fundamental human relationship.”355 Moreover, the state has created a
monopoly for itself over the resolution of a minor’s abortion decision.
Indeed, Martin Guggenheim has argued that the bypass arrangement gives
judges not just a monopoly but an impermissible veto over the young’
woman’s decision.356
To be clear, my argument here is not about the denial of due
process to minors (although others may be interested in the project).357 My
concern is the harm inflicted by the bypass process on the legal system
itself. A similar concern was recognized in Boddie. As the Court made
clear, at the point where a “judicial proceeding becomes the only effective
means of resolving the dispute at hand,” the “denial of a defendant’s full
access to that process raises grave problems for its legitimacy.”358 One way
of expressing the gravity of the problem is as a constitutional violation. But
the values that underlie the Fourteenth Amendment—the premises “that this
Court has through years of adjudication [used to] put flesh upon the due
process principle”359—register even outside the formal constitutional
framework. Although bypass hearings are not about dispute settlement (or
are not supposed to be) the Court’s concerns in Boddie apply:

354
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American society bottoms its systematic definition of individual
rights and duties, as well as its machinery for dispute settlement,
not on custom or the will of strategically placed individuals, but
on the common-law model. It is to courts, or other quasi-judicial
official bodies, that we ultimately look for the implementation of
a regularized, orderly process of dispute settlement . . . Only by
providing that the social enforcement mechanism must function
strictly within these bounds can we hope to maintain an ordered
society that is also just.360

VII. ABORTION POLITICS AND BYPASS PROCESSES
The politics of abortion is apparent in both the structure and the
judicial implementation of the bypass process. Certain interventions have
been procedural. These include judges appointing counsel for the fetus,361
establishing a higher than usual burden of proof by taking an imagined
parental perspective into account,362 and denying petitions on extrastatutory grounds, such as requiring the minor to be “extraordinarily
mature.”363 Judicial opposition to abortion has also colored how the
hearings are conducted. Judges have questioned petitioners as though
abortion’s legality was unresolved, as though the only measure of a
petitioner’s maturity was the decision not to abort and the hearing offered a
chance to remonstrate against it. They have asked petitioning minors
whether they understand that abortion is murder, whether they would kill
their own three-year-old child, whether they change their mind about
abortion if they knew their baby would go to a loving adoptive family or if
they were given $2000.364 Bypass denials have been sprinkled with pro-life
360
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sentiment: “This is a capital case. It involves the question whether [the
minor’s] unborn child should live or die.”365 And some judges refuse to hear
bypass cases at all.
Judicial opposition to abortion may stem from a judge’s religious
beliefs or from concerns about election, or both. Some 87% of all state and
local judges now run for election in some form or other,366 and a study of
judicial elections over a twenty-five-year period shows that abortion has
become a prominent issue in judicial campaigns.367 Judicial candidates have
advertised themselves as being pro-life during an election,368 and have
publicly celebrated the fact thereafter.369
In this last section, I want to make three points about the relation
between judicial elections and the fair administration of justice in the
bypass setting. The first is simply that the two issues cannot be isolated
from one another. To avoid being associated with abortion at all, judges
have fought to keep their names off reported bypass decisions,
unsuccessfully in Ohio370 and successfully in Texas.371 From a political
365
In re Anonymous, 905 So. 2d 845, 850 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005). The minor had
also testified that she worked part-time at two restaurants during the preceding year-and-ahalf; that the father of the child no longer speaks to her and has no interest in raising the
child; and that, while she did not want to tell her parents about the abortion at the time of the
hearing, she planned to tell them in the future when she felt comfortable.
366

See Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 181, 181 (2004). These include both initial elections
and retention votes after appointment.
367

See Brandice Canes-Wrone & Tom S. Clark, Judicial Independence and
Nonpartisan Elections, 2009 WIS. L. REV 21, 31–33 (2009) (presenting evidence that
nonpartisan electoral systems affect judicial decisions to a greater degree than partisan
electoral systems as voters draw no inferences from party affiliation and press candidates for
their views on particular issues, such as abortion).
368

Deters v. Judicial Ret. and Removal Comm’n, 873 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Ky. 1994).
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See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Richard B. Sanders, 955 P.2d
369, 377 (Wash. 1998). In that case, immediately after being sworn in as a newly elected
justice of the Washington State Supreme Court, Justice Richard Sanders left his own
inauguration ceremony to join a March for Life rally on the steps of the state legislature. At
the rally Sanders wished the crowd well “in this celebration of human life,” stating that ‘“I
owe my election to many of the people who are here today.” Id. at 371. A subsequent
reprimand by the Judicial Conduct Commission was reversed on the ground that there had
not been clear and convincing grounds that Sander’s speech had threatened or compromised
the integrity or impartiality of the judiciary. See id. at 377.
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State ex rel. The Cincinnati Post v. Second Dist. Ct. of Appeals, 604 N.E.2d
153 (Ohio 1992).
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point of view, this may make sense. The official 2006 platform of the Texas
Republican Party called for the “electoral defeat of all judges who through
raw judicial activism seek to nullify the Parental Consent Law by wantonly
granting bypasses to minor girls seeking abortion.”372
A Kentucky case further illustrates the relationship between
elections and the bypass process. In 1991, Jed Deters, a candidate for a
district court judgeship in Northern Kentucky, ran political ads in two local
newspapers stating “Jed Deters is a Pro-Life Candidate.”373 Deters lost the
election but was censured by the Kentucky Judicial Retirement and
Removal Commission for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct canon
prohibiting “statements that commit or appear to commit” a candidate with
respect to cases, controversies, or issues likely to come before the court.374
In upholding Deters’ censure on appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court
expressed “no doubt” that Deters had intended to commit himself on prolife issues; as he “freely testified that ‘any good Catholic is pro-life,’ that
Kenyon County has a high percentage of Catholic voters, and that his
statement . . . would ‘hopefully’ give him a ‘distinct edge in the race,’ since
‘you’re in it to win. You do what it takes.’”375
Deters argued that he had not violated the canon, not because he
hadn’t committed on the issue, but because no abortion issue was likely to
come before the court and so the canon didn’t apply. He explained that the
only two hospitals in the county were Catholic and didn’t provide abortions,
that there were no abortion clinics, and that not one “abortion-related case”
had come before the court in ten years.376 The court rejected the argument,

371

Donald, supra note 167. Bypass politics go all the way up. Texas Supreme
Court Justice Deborah Hankinson was passed over for appointment to the Fifth Circuit by
President George W. Bush in favor of Justice Priscilla Owens because of their comparative
positions interpreting Texas’s bypass statute. As attorney Susan Hays observed, “[t]hese are
members of the Texas Supreme Court. Can you imagine what disclosure would do to a
small-town, conservative judge?” Id.
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Republican Party of Tex., 2006 State Republican Party Platform 15 (June 1,
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reminding Deters that under state law, a judicial bypass petition might
indeed come before the court.377
Of course, Deters probably described the docket in Kenyon County
accurately. As he pointed out, Cincinnati is only fifteen minutes away (if in
another state), and local girls may well make the trip if they want to file a
bypass petition.378 But while Deters may have had his numbers right, I think
he had the causation wrong. The absence of abortion cases does not
determine the permissible scope of campaign speech. Pregnant minors who
know where local judges stand are more likely to try their bypass luck
elsewhere.
This leads to the second discouraging point about abortion politics
and the bypass process. Where judges stand on abortion, as on other
substantive issues, is likely to become increasingly well-known. In 2002, in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the United States Supreme Court
invalidated a Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct provision prohibiting
judicial candidates from “announcing” their views on disputed legal and
political issues.379 The Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that the prohibition
violated the First Amendment rights of judicial candidates.380 It is unclear if
White, which dealt with an “announce” clause necessarily invalidates
“commit clauses,” of the kind at issue in the Deters case.381 Yet it seems
quite clear that judicial candidates after White are freer to express their
views—if not their commitment regarding future cases—on the matter of
abortion.
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Id. (noting that other non-bypass claims involving his pro-life views might
come before the court, including “misdemeanor cases . . . involving abortion protests,
including trespass, disorderly conduct, or assault,” and non-abortion issues such as “living
wills and . . . removing tubes or respirators”).
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Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002). The candidate
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decision holding that the Minnesota Legislature’s refusal to provide welfare medical benefits
for abortions violated a woman’s right to an abortion. Brief of Petitioners-Appellant Wersal
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This is clear from a new study by political scientists challenging the
conventional wisdom regarding judicial independence and structure of
judicial elections, which uses decisions on abortion-related cases as its data.
The thought has long been that nonpartisan elections, where judges’ party
affiliations are not on the ballot or on their campaign literature, increases
judicial independence because candidates are freed from the constraints of
party platforms and from immediate association with candidates for other
elected offices.382 But the study suggests that nonpartisan elections, in
which voters have little to work with but claims of character, encourage
judges to be more responsive to public opinion as single-issue interest
groups and aggressive media push unaffiliated candidates to articulate their
views with particularity. Judicial candidates in nonpartisan elections have
been questioned by state Right to Life Committees (asking if they “believe
Roe v. Wade was wrongly decided”);383 television ads criticized an
incumbent by claiming “[in Judge] Janet Stumbo’s opinion . . . there’s no
criminal liability for killing an unborn child.”384 Certainly the holding in
White and the “nastier, noisier, and costlier” manner of judicial
campaigns385 raise deep concerns about the “‘disinterestedness’ of the
judiciary”386 and about the relation between a politicized bench and the rule
of law.387
Yet the proper balance between free speech concerns and judicial
impartiality is not the focus of this paper. Accepting White as good law, my
interest is on its impact on the operation of the bypass process. After all,
Roe and Casey are still good law too. The question I have put on the table is
382

Canes-Wrone & Clark, supra note 367, at 34.

383

Id.

384

Id. See generally Anthony Champagne, Television Ads in Judicial Campaigns,
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See Roy A. Schotland, Judicial Independence and Accountability, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 150 (1998).
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Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 802 (2002) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“The Court seems to have forgotten its prior evaluation of the importance of
maintaining public confidence in the ‘disinterestedness’ of the judiciary.”); id. at 818
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Prohibiting a judicial candidate from pledging or promising
certain results if elected directly promotes the State’s interest in preserving public faith in the
bench.”).
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See also Paul J. De Muniz, Politicizing State Judicial Elections: A Threat to
Judicial Independence, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 367, 387 (2002) (“Dedication to the rule of
law requires judges to rise above the political moment in making judicial decisions.”).
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whether in the face of all this good law, judicial hearings are appropriate or
fair to decide about a minor’s maturity or whether they are a piercing
misuse of law. In asking the question, I am not challenging the free speech
rights of judicial candidates. I am suggesting that the demonstrated and
growing exercise of judicial speech with regard to abortion provides another
potent reason why bypass hearings should be abandoned as the means of
supervising teenage abortion decisions.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The two objections to the bypass process I have set out—harm to
girls and harm to the legal system—add up to a third injustice at a societal
level. A legal system that requires young pregnant women to participate in
hearings whose main function is to harass and to punish is not the kind of
system one should expect in a just or decent society. Avishai Margalit has
identified a decent society as one whose institutions do not cause people to
feel humiliated.388 Judicial bypass hearings humiliate. They require detailed
disclosures from vulnerable young women on the most intimate of subjects
and often for reasons that have little to do with the state’s interest in their
welfare. This is a considerable and an unjustified intrusion on privacy,
which is for Margalit “in itself a paradigmatic act of humiliation.”389
It is particularly distressing that legal process is being used in this
pursuit. Courthouses, or certainly the old ones, were sites of civic pride:
they were grand because grand things were decided; law itself was in
operation. The treatment of minors is the more troubling because there is no
need to use judicial hearings as the means by which teenage abortion
decisions are supervised. Nothing about a judicial hearing is constitutionally
compelled. Bellotti focused on hearings because that was the procedure
before the Court, but as the Court made clear, “much can be said for
employing procedures and a forum less formal than those associated with a
court of general jurisdiction.”390
Several states have enacted just such measures. Maine, for example,
authorizes minors either to get the consent of a parent or another adult
family member or to receive counseling from designated counselors,
including clergy, nurses, or psychologists. These counselors must provide
the minor not only with information about abortion but also about adoption,
388
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pregnancy, and state benefits for child-rearing.391 Delaware has also
widened the scope of those to whom a minor might turn: notice can be
given to a grandparent or a licensed mental health professional instead of
parent or legal guardian. As in Maine, the person is required to explain that
“the options available to [the minor] include adoption, abortion, and fullterm pregnancy” and must also agree that it is in the minor’s best interests
to waive parental consent.392
These more capacious mechanisms for adult involvement in a
minor’s abortion decision make great sense. Teenagers are commonly
connected to a broader network of communities than their immediate
families and the law should take advantage of those connections.393 If there
is legislative concern about minors proceeding without adult participation
(other than the physician), offering minors an array of trusted sources may
well produce a more individualized, more sustained, and more substantive
intervention than the haphazard and often reluctant participation by a judge.
After all, the judge has no stake in the particular minor, does no follow-up,
and is unlikely ever to see her again. In contrast, those she trusts are likely
to be available at all stages of her decision–making process and after, and to
treat her fairly along the way.
Each year over one million women in the United States decide,
usually for a combination of reasons—their finances, their aspirations for
the future, the absence of their partner, their obligations to existing children,
and their health or that of the fetus—not to continue a pregnancy.394 Put
391

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1597-a (1992).
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Parental Notice of Abortion Act, DEL CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1783(a) (2009). The
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Funk, Abortion Counseling and the 1995 German Abortion Law, 12 CONN. J. INT’L L. 33
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Bishops On Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1999, at A9. In response to the prohibition,
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another way, forty percent of all American women will have had an
abortion before their reproductive years are over.395 These numbers suggest
that most of us are likely to know someone who has had or will have an
abortion. They are our students and colleagues, our wives, daughters, and
neighbors. Surely some of them are not the kind of person we think should
be humiliated by legal process. Indeed, I am never sure which women
people think should be humiliated by law, but teenagers seem to be high on
many people’s lists.396
Here I return to the concept of decisional dignity. If a woman has
the right to decide whether or not to terminate an unwanted pregnancy, her
decision should not be taxed with a hidden surcharge of punishment by
process. Of course we want young women to make informed decisions and
to be able to talk over a decision as serious as one about whether to become
a mother with those who care about them and in whom they trust. But
judicial bypass hearings have little to do with improving the quality of a
minor’s abortion decision, and much to do with punishing her if she
proceeds.
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See Francine T. Sherman, Thoughts on a Contextual View of Juvenile Justice
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